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8.1  Introduction 
The American financial system has been an outlier internationally in virtu- 
ally every important respect for the past century. It has been the most geograph- 
ically fragmented and the most susceptible to financial crises (Calomiris and 
Gorton 1991; Calomiris 1993). It has been among the most restrictive of com- 
binations of financial services within intermediaries, although in recent years 
some of these restrictions have begun to be relaxed (Kaufman and Mote 1989, 
1990). The American system has also been the most persistently  innovative 
financial system in the world. Often, important innovations have been induced 
by regulatory restrictions that raised the cost of finance under preexisting fi- 
nancial technology. 
These observations are commonplace. Other unusual aspects of  American 
financial history  have received less attention, including  the relative lack of 
bank involvement in industrial finance, the heavy reliance on corporate bonds 
as a means of finance, the high costs of securities underwriting, and the high 
cost of capital in American industry. 
The main goal of this paper is to weave these peculiar features of the Ameri- 
can system into a single interpretive tapestry. The central argument of the paper 
is that regulatory limitations on the scale and scope of  banking in America 
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hampered financial coordination and substantially increased the cost of capital 
for industrialization, particularly in the period of the growth of large-scale in- 
dustrial enterprises prior to World War I. This may  seem a strange claim in 
light of American growth and financial innovativeness. The claim is not that 
America failed to grow and prosper, but that large-scale industrial investment 
was stunted relative to its potential by a faulty financial system. 
To gauge the costs of American banking regulation, I compare and contrast 
the American and German financial systems. Rapid industrial growth in new 
industries and the increasing importance of large-scale enterprises are common 
features of the German and American experience in the pre-World  War I era. 
The second industrial revolution witnessed rapid growth in industries that ex- 
ploited new technological breakthroughs and produced entirely new products. 
The scale of firms was much larger than during earlier episodes of industrial 
expansion. Large-scale production of new products using  new  technologies 
created unprecedented challenges for the financial system. Large-scale produc- 
tion implied greater reliance on external funding, and the novelty of the prod- 
ucts and techniques  made it especially  difficult  for uninformed  “outsiders” 
with available funds to judge the merits of the various investment opportuni- 
ties. The ability of the financial system to mobilize and direct large amounts 
of funds into new firms was a prerequisite to rapid industrialization. 
The means of financing industrial expansion during this period in the United 
States and Germany were quite different. The German universal banks (Kredit- 
banken)-sometimes  referred  to as  the joint-stock  or  credit  banks-were 
large-scale, externally financed, limited-liability banks. These banks operated 
nationwide branching networks and provided an unrestricted range of  services, 
including lending, underwriting, trust services, and deposit taking. They held 
and underwrote securities issued by clients and made conventional  loans for 
industrial  purposes. They maintained close ties with the firms they financed 
and exerted control over corporate decision making in their combined role as 
lenders, stockholders, trustees of stock portfolios,  and members of boards of 
directors. 
The American banking system, in contrast, was shaped by  restrictions on 
branching  and  consolidation  that  protected  unit  (single-office) banks.’  The 
fragmentation of  commercial banking limited American banks’  involvement 
in supplying credit to large-scale firms. Over the nineteenth century, as indus- 
trial firm size grew, the role of banks as suppliers of industrial credit waned, 
and commercial banks focused increasingly on financing commerce (Lamo- 
reaux 1994).  Private bankers operating partnerships (also known as investment 
bankers) filled the gap in American finance, but because they had limited re- 
sources, they relied on underwriting syndicates, funded in a decentralized way 
by an elaborate network of  commercial banks, trust companies, and brokers, 
1. Direct restrictions on the types of activities banks could finance-notably,  attempts to confine 
bank lending to the financing of commerce, which is often referred to as the “real bills doctrine”- 
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to raise funds for the firms they financed. Like universal bankers in Germany, 
investment bankers established methods for monitoring and controlling corpo- 
rate management of the firms they financed. 
Clearly, these are two very different ways of coordinating the flow of funds 
from savers to investors. But did these differences matter? In  section  8.2, I 
review general theoretical and empirical perspectives that suggest why they 
may have mattered. Here the review is selective, and serves to introduce con- 
cepts that will be emphasized in section 8.3’s detailed discussion of the Ger- 
man and American financial  systems and economies.  Section 8.3 compares 
and contrasts the German and American experiences, argues that the various 
differences between them are mutually consistent, and points to evidence of 
higher costs of industrial finance in the United States. That section closes with 
a brief historical review of the different evolution of financial regulations and 
institutions in the two countries. 
Section 8.4 offers some conjectures on why inefficient restrictions on bank- 
ing have persisted in the United States. Limitations on branching and restric- 
tions on joint production of financial services did not disappear as their costs 
became apparent. Indeed, the Great Depression saw an increase in restrictions, 
most notably the separation of commercial and investment banking, many new 
restrictions on securities transactions, a reversal of direction in the regulatory 
trend toward branching and consolidation of the  1920s, and the subsidization 
of unit banking by the creation of federal deposit insurance. Political consider- 
ations, as well as endogenous changes in financial technology that lowered the 
costs of regulation, may help to explain persistently poor banking regulation 
in the United States. 
8.2  General Perspectives on Universal Banking 
This section provides an overview of general theoretical and empirical per- 
spectives on universal banking, which will serve as a basis for the discussion 
of section 8.3. I begin with a discussion of the role of various intermediaries 
and contracting arrangements for mitigating financing costs. Second, I argue 
that the form of financial instrument and the intermediation arrangement cho- 
sen by a firm reflect its place in the financial “pecking order,” which is largely 
determined  by  the  stage it has reached in its financial “life cycle.” Third, I 
examine the role played by universal banking in reducing firm financing costs. 
Universal  banking  is  defined  as a  combination  of  activities  performed  by 
banks, including deposit taking, trust services, direct lending, equity holding, 
and underwriting. Informational economies account for economies of scope 
among the three  forms  of  intermediary  financing of  firms  (lending, equity 
holding, and underwriting). These economies of scope are driven by considera- 
tions  of  time consistency,  the reusability of information  over the  firm’s life 
cycle, and improvements in the quality of  signals generated by  underwriters. 
Fourth, I consider the effect of restrictions on bank branching on the efficiency 260  Charles W.  Calomiris 
of universal banking. The benefits of universal banking are enhanced in a sys- 
tem that allows banks to branch. Direct access to sources of  funds through 
deposit and trust accounts reduces the costs of marketing securities by facilitat- 
ing the flow of  information  and limiting the number of  layers of  securities 
transactions. 
This four-part summary of the economics of universal banking places uni- 
versal banking in the context of theoretical literature on the role of banks and 
the financing structure of  corporations. The changing needs of  corporations 
over time correspond to different financial products produced by the universal 
bank. The advantages of a long-term relationship between a firm and an inter- 
mediary are best achieved by allowing the intermediary to perform a variety 
of tasks. The advantages of universal banking are best achieved in the context 
of large-scale banking, where transactions and information costs of  syndica- 
tions are minimized. 
The theoretical discussion closes by linking these arguments to others made 
in the existing literature, both for and against universal banking. My emphasis 
on benefits of universal banking from reductions in corporate finance costs is 
also related to the question of portfolio diversification benefits under universal 
banking. Much of the recent policy debate over universal banking in the United 
States has focused on potential advantages from diversification from allowing 
commercial banks broader powers. A weakness of some of  these studies has 
been the implicit assumption that available market assets are invariant to the 
establishment of universal banking. Potential benefits from diversification de- 
pend on the effect universal banks have on the feasible set of externally fi- 
nanced investments. If universal banking reduces corporate finance costs, then 
it enlarges the set of investments available to “outsiders.” 
Common theoretical arguments against universal banking are considered in 
light of theory and history. These include destabilization of the financial sys- 
tem, conflicts of interest, and inefficiency from lack of competition in banking 
or in industry. Theory and history support the view that universal banking is a 
stabilizing influence on banking. Furthermore, potential problems of conflict 
of interest can be overcome if universal banks are allowed to hold or manage 
equity as well as to underwrite and lend. Finally, while bank concentration and 
long-term links between firms and their banks may encourage lack of competi- 
tion  among banks or firms, Germany’s universal  banking  system had  many 
observable advantages, and was not a necessary condition for the formation of 
industrial cartels. 
8.2.1  The Roles of Financial Intermediaries 
Financing investment is fundamentally  a problem of  coordination. Savers 
and investors need a low-cost means to transact. Of course, ultimate savers and 
investors virtually  never meet. Rather, each deals with an intermediary,  and 
often ultimate savers and investors do not use the same intermediary. In many 261  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
transactions, complex hierarchies of intermediation may be employed. For ex- 
ample,  many  individuals  own  securities  primarily  through  pension  funds. 
Pension-fund  managers might purchase  securities  through  local bankers or 
dealers, who in turn may be marketing these securities for an investment bank- 
ing syndicate formed and financed by a small group of banks, and managed by 
a lead investment bank who negotiates the deal with the issuing firm. 
The links separating the individual saver and the firm issuing the security in 
this case are many, and involve substantial costs. These costs can be divided 
usefully into two categories: costs of information collection and transmittal- 
that is, costs of creating and enforcing mechanisms that lead to credible moni- 
toring of firms and revelation of the true state of firm finances-and  physical 
transactions costs-costs  associated with legal and accounting paperwork, and 
with physically distributing securities to ultimate holders. 
Recent contributions to the literature in banking and corporate finance have 
drawn attention to the ways various institutional arrangements can economize 
on such costs. For example, the costs to investment banking syndicates of col- 
lecting information about the proper pricing of new issues may be affected by 
the mechanism chosen for the initial marketing of the securities. Rationing of 
issues to a select group of securities purchasers who have repeated contact with 
the investment banking house may encourage truthful revelation of information 
about the value of the securities by those purchasers prior to the issue. Benve- 
niste and Spindt (1989) argue that this beneficial revelation effect explains 
various otherwise puzzling features of the marketing and pricing of initial pub- 
lic offerings (IPOs). More generally, investment banks are valuable to the econ- 
omy because they provide a low-cost means of generating and disseminating 
credible information about firms’ characteristics, which benefits both securi- 
ties issuers and purchasers in deciding on the form and price of the security 
used to finance an investment. 
The recent literature on banking also views commercial banks as solving 
problems that arise from physical transactions costs and information asymme- 
try, and sees the form of intermediaries’ contracts as a key determinant of the 
cost of  finance. Banks economize on physical costs of transacting (clearing 
payments, liquidating insolvent firms), costs of generating information (moni- 
toring firms’ actions and outcomes), and costs of enforcing contractual compli- 
ance on the part of firms and bankers (disciplining borrowers and protecting 
against improper behavior by  the banker at the expense of those funding the 
bank). 
Models of banking stress the economies of concentrating funds in banks and 
appointing the banker as the “delegated monitor” of bank borrowers (Campbell 
and  Kracaw  1980; Diamond  1984; Calomiris  and  Kahn  1991; Calomiris, 
Kahn, and Krasa 1992). Banking arrangements can avoid duplication in moni- 
toring bank borrowers  and thus reduce banking costs. Enforcement  of con- 
tracts  (monitoring  and discipline)  is also less  costly  if  a single agent with 
proper incentives can specialize in the task. 262  Charles W.  Calomiris 
Empirical evidence on the characteristics of firms choosing banks as financ- 
ing  sources confirms the view  that  banks  specialize in performing  ongoing 
monitoring  and contractual  enforcement  for firms  whose  access to outside 
funding otherwise would be limited (Butters and Lintner  1945; Fazzari, Hub- 
bard, and Petersen  1989; James and Wier  1988, 1990; Mackie-Mason  1990). 
Other firms-older,  better-known firms-have  access to securities markets on 
better terms and can avoid the costs of bank finance. These firms typically still 
use intermediaries (like investment banks) to assist them in determining what 
types of securities to issue and in credibly signaling the value of their securities 
(Benveniste and Spindt 1989; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984), but they avoid 
at least some of the ongoing costs of bank finance. Costs of bank finance in- 
clude regulatory costs (like reserve requirements), monitoring costs, and rents 
the bank may extract from firms it finances by virtue of its possession of private 
information, as in Rajan 1992a. 
Empirical  studies of the effects of bank lending decisions on the prices of 
existing securities or bank borrowers also provide evidence of the role of banks 
as “insiders” with respect to information relevant for valuing claims on firms 
to which they lend. Announcing  financing arrangements  between banks and 
firms increases firms’ stock prices (James 1987; James and Wier  1988). Bank 
participation in working out corporate distress increases the value of distressed 
firms’ stock (Gilson, John, and Lang 1990), especially when banks are willing 
to take a junior position  in the firm (Brown, James,  and  Mooradian  1991). 
Japanese firms with close, long-term banking relationships  are better able to 
maintain investment levels than other firms during episodes of financial dis- 
tress (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein  1990a, 1990b). 
8.2.2  The Financial “Pecking Order” and the “Life Cycle” of Firms 
The growing theoretical literature in corporate finance focuses on how par- 
ticular financing arrangements mitigate some costs at the expense of others. In 
some cases, using an investment bank may be desirable because it provides a 
low-cost means of signaling the value of securities. In other cases, bank loans 
may be the appropriate financing vehicle, possibly because of banks’ low costs 
of managing financial distress or of monitoring managers’ actions and enhanc- 
ing corporate control. 
The  new  “information-based”  approach  to  corporate  finance  revolves 
around the financial “pecking order”-a  continuum of financing instruments 
defined according  to the elasticity of their cost with respect to problems of 
asymmetric  information  (Myers  1984; Myers  and  Majluf  1984; Diamond 
1991). Firms progress up the pecking order of finance as they mature. Firms 
just starting out may be forced to rely exclusively on retained earnings and the 
wealth of  insiders. After a successful beginning, the firm can rely on “inside 
debt” in the form of bank loans. The bank  spends resources to monitor the 
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the firm.2 As the firm matures and develops a track record, its financing will 
change. Informed intermediaries will be willing to take equity positions in the 
firm (as in the venture capital market), which will reduce the leverage of the 
firm and its exposure to financial distress, and provide a positive signal to out- 
side investors. Outside finance through securities may initially take the form 
of senior instruments with protective covenants (e.g., bonds). Later, firms will 
graduate to issuing preferred and common stock on the open market to outsid- 
ers, using underwriters as a means for providing credible signals of the firm’s 
value to outsiders. 
The maturity of debt instruments chosen can reflect a tradeoff between the 
information and transactions costs of finance. Short-term debt mitigates incen- 
tive problems between banks and firms. As Jensen and Meckling (1976, 334- 
37) show, debt contracts create a potential agency problem known as the “asset 
substitution  effect.” Once debt contracts are entered into, managers with an 
equity interest in the firm may have an incentive to take on greater risk, because 
they are only concerned with expanding the upper tail of the asset returns dis- 
tribution. Short-term debt can be useful as a means to restrict such risk takmg. 
Firms that increase risk face the threat that their loans will not be rolled over, 
or will be rolled over only at a higher interest rate. If lenders keep debt short- 
term and monitor borrowers’  actions, borrowers will find little benefit in in- 
creasing risk, so long as the threat of the bank’s rollover response is credible 
(e.g., see Pennacchi 1983; Gorton and Kahn 1992). Similarly, bank-loan con- 
tracts typically allow acceleration of the maturity of debt when the firm’s posi- 
tion  deteriorates.  This  right  of  acceleration  is  particularly  powerful  in  re- 
stricting borrower  risk  taking  when  combined  with  compensating  balance 
requirements (which force firms to hold their checking accounts in the bank) 
and the option of deposit setoff (bank seizure of deposits), as Garber and Weis- 
brod (1991) argue. 
Despite the advantages of short-term debt in protecting lenders and encour- 
aging proper behavior by  borrowers, short-term debt has higher transactions 
2. Given the general predominance of debt finance, particularly in banking, recent contracting 
models try to explain the optimality of debt. Debt claims are often a desirable means of finance 
when claimants are relatively uninformed about firm  opportunities or outcomes, or when outcomes 
are difficult to demonstrate to a third party. As Myers and Majluf (1984) show, in a world where 
firms’ opportunities are unobservable ex ante, debt suffers less of a “lemons premium” than equity 
because the payoffs to debt depend less on the unobservable information. Townsend (1979). Dia- 
mond (1984). Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1986), and others have argued that costs of 
ex post monitoring and third-party verification favor the use of debt contracts. Lacker (1991) shows 
that debt is especially useful in these environments as a means to penalize firms by threatening to 
take collateralized assets that have special value to the firms’ operators. 
These arguments for the optimality of debt contracting may help explain the reliance by banks 
on deposits and banknotes as the primary means of “outsider” financing of bank activities histori- 
cally (as argued above), and the use of debt as the primary means of “outsider” finance of many 
corporations. But these arguments do not suggest that bank financing of firms will always, or even 
mainly, occur in the form of debt. Indeed, the pecking-order theory of  corporate finance-which 
emphasizes the role of debt as an optimal means of financing outsiders’ contributions to the firm- 
suggests advantages from insiders’ avoidance of debt, as argued below. 264  Charles W. Calomiris 
costs than long-term debt. The costs of renegotiation and rollover are espe- 
cially large for nonbunk debt, which must be physically redeemed and reissued 
to a widely dispersed group of creditors3 For example, the costs of issuing 
bonds (costs charged for paperwork and for fees to the investment banking 
syndicate marketing the bonds) averaged 6 percent of the size of the issue in 
the United States during 1925-29 (Securities and Exchange Commission 1940, 
10-11). If the maturity of these bonds had been, say, one year rather than the 
actual  fifteen-to-twenty-year  average  maturity  (Hickman  1960,  152),  this 
would have entailed a significant increase in the cost of funds. Thus, short- 
term debts of firms typically  take the form of bank loans (with low rollover 
costs) or short-term trade   red it.^ 
In summary, banks, investment banks, and other intermediaries can be seen 
as “optimal mechanisms” for connecting particular groups of savers and invest- 
ors in a world of  costly transactions and asymmetric  information. Informa- 
tional characteristics of firms (the availability of  a track record, the costs to 
outsiders of  monitoring and controlling activities  of the firm) are important 
determinants of  whether firms choose to finance themselves with  securities 
issues or with bank  lending, and of the form and maturity of the financing 
instrument. This  approach emphasizes  the importance  of  financing  through 
banks in the early stages of  the life cycle of  the firm, and sees other forms 
of  intermediation (investment  banking) as depending  on earlier information 
creation by  the  firm’s track  record  with inside lenders.  Choice  variables for 
minimizing financing costs include the intermediation  technology used, the 
forms of the claims issued (e.g., debt or equity) by firms and intermediaries, 
their maturity, covenants on behavior and options granted to holders or issuers 
of  claims on firms or banks, liquidation rules, allocation of  voting authority, 
agreements that ensure a long-term relationship between or among contracting 
parties (and thereby solve problems of time inconsistency), and the voluntary 
formation of coalitions (of banks, investment banks, or informed IPO purchas- 
ers), which regulate the behavior of members5 
3. Another reason why banks may be in a better position to offer short-term debt is suggested 
in recent work by  Diamond (1992). He argues that  short-term debt can be costly when held by 
uninformed lenders because they may be too quick to liquidate a solvent, but illiquid, firm. One 
could argue that, if banks are better informed about firms, they will be able to reap the disciplinary 
advantages of short-term debt without creating losses through excessive liquidations. 
4.  In addition to bank loans, the United States developed an important innovation in commercial 
and industrial finance, which became known as the commercial paper market. For reasons related 
to  its  fragmented  banking  system, bankers’  acceptances  and  foreign  bills  of  exchange never 
reached the level of importance in the United States that they did elsewhere (Calomiris 1993).  The 
commercial paper market developed as a means for banks to transfer their lowest-risk customers 
to other intermediaries, to take advantage of lower costs of finance in other locations. The commer- 
cial paper market was a unique feature of the American financial system, which grew substantially 
in importance during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 
5. An important contributor to minimizing finance costs has been coalitions of  banks, whose 
function includes cooperation in underwriting networks, interbank correspondent relations, cost- 265  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
8.2.3  The Advantages of Universal Banking 
The pecking-order framework implies that financing arrangements that ac- 
celerate the process of seasoning a firm and economize on the costs of informa- 
tion production and corporate governance can stimulate investment by reduc- 
ing the costs of external finance. In this light, the main advantage of universal 
banking is that it encourages a long-term relationship to develop between a 
firm and its intermediary by allowing the intermediary to vary the form of firm 
financing as the firm matures, in keeping with the optimal financing arrange- 
ment, which changes over the life cycle of the firm. Initially, the intermediary 
lends directly to the firm. Later, it will be best for the same intermediary to 
underwrite the firm’s securities issues (either by itself or as a leader of a syndi- 
cate of universal banks). Underwriting will require that the bank be allowed to 
own (and act as trustee for) shares of the firm. Without the flexibility to vary 
the form of the bank-firm relationship, relationships between firms and banks 
are unlikely to persist over the firm’s life cycle. 
By “long-term” I mean that the firm and bank have a credible implicit con- 
tract to continue to do business in the future. The firm cannot switch banks 
costlessly. The advantage of a credible long-term relationship is that it encour- 
ages banks to lend to firms on favorable terms in anticipation of a continuing 
relationship. The costs of gathering information about a firm’s credit risk is 
high for unseasoned firms, which pay for bank monitoring in the form of higher 
interest cost on loans. If  banks can spread the cost of  monitoring over many 
periods, this reduces the initial costs of borrowing and allows firms to pay less 
for credit during their early years when investment needs are high and cash 
flow is low. Despite the advantages of a long-term relationship for smoothing 
the cost of credit to firms, there is a potential “time-inconsistency’’ problem 
that makes it difficult for banks to postpone charging firms for high early moni- 
toring costs. Firms receiving low-interest loans in their early years may opt 
out of  the initial banking relationship once they become  seasoned and have 
opportunities to borrow from other intermediaries. Competing intermediaries 
may be able to provide credit at lower cost in the later stage of the firm life 
cycle because the costs of monitoring the firm have fallen as the result of  its 
observable credit history  with the initial bank (James and Wier 1990).  Thus, 
competing banks may be able to “free ride” on the initial bank’s efforts. 
In practice, long-term exclusivity can be enforced in two ways. First, to the 
extent that competing banks are unable to learn relevant information about the 
firm from the initial bank’s lending decisions, the initial bank’s investment in 
effective payment clearings, and perhaps most important, coalitions for mutual protection. Such 
coalitions are more easily organized, managed, and self-regulated in a concentrated banking sys- 
tem. For discussions of  several examples, see Gorton 1985, 1989: Gorton and Mullineaux 1987; 
Calomiris 1989, 1990, 1993: Calomiris and Kahn 1990, 1991; and Calomiris and Schweikart 1991. 266  Charles W. Calomiris 
information about the firm at an early stage reduces future costs of granting 
credit or underwriting only for the initial bank, so the firm and bank are natu- 
rally drawn to one another for repeat business.h Second, banks may prohibit 
“their”  firms from doing business  with other banks  (Neuburger and Stokes 
1974, 713). Presumably, such prohibitions would be enforced by cooperation 
among the banks to limit deviation  from this rule. While finance historians 
have argued that banks in Germany and the United States were not successful 
in enforcing  exclusivity  once clients became  large, well-known  firms (Tilly 
1992, 109), nevertheless, for a limited period of time such enforcement may 
have been important. 
Given the benefits to borrowers from interest cost smoothing, such collusion 
among banks is not necessarily a bad thing. Although it may allow banks to 
extract rent from firms, without it the advantages of  a long-term relationship 
may not be available to young, growing firms. Mayer (1988) cites post-World 
War I1 Japan as an example of successful elimination of information externali- 
ties  among banks  through  credible  long-term  contracting,  made feasible by 
limits on period-by-period competition among banks. Without a credible long- 
term relationship between firms and banks, banks may have been unwilling to 
pay fixed costs initially and bear risk during early stages of industrialization of 
infant industries. 
Another important avenue for internalizing externalities for banks lending 
to young, growing firms is to  allow banks to take equity positions  in these 
firms. This allows banks to benefit fully from the positive signal they create 
when they finance firms. Also, by making banks junior claimants on the firm, 
equity holding  provides  a  strong  incentive  for continuing  diligence  by  the 
banker (Pozdena 1991).’ Equity financing has other advantages as well. It re- 
6.  Given the evidence of disadvantages from not creating a long-term bank relationship, or of 
deciding to discontinue one (Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1990a, 1990b;  De Long 1991; Ram- 
irez 1992). it may seem puzzling that some firms did not opt for such a close, long-term relation- 
ship. A simple example will help to fix ideas, and help one to understand why some firms may 
choose not to borrow from universal banks, or to discontinue borrowing eventually. Suppose that 
the costs to a bank at time zero of starting a relationship with a firm consist of monitoring costs, 
which decline over time. To  be concrete, assume the initial cost to the bank is X,  and the costs for 
all subsequent periods is m per period. Furthermore, assume that, if the firm cannot borrow from 
a bank, it must rely only on retained earnings to finance investment, and that this entails a reduction 
in profitable investment (alternatively, one could assume the firm will borrow from nonbanks at a 
higher cost, reflecting a lemons premium on uninformed lending). For simplicity. assume the firm 
will need external funding for only  10 periods,  after which its investment opportunities can be 
completely financed from its (larger) stream of retained earnings. The bank will charge a fee for 
the ten  periods of 2  per period. which includes reimbursement  for X  and m costs, and possibly 
additional rents extracted by the bank (if the bank has an initial information advantage over its 
competitors).  The firm compares the value of joining the bank (the present value of firm assets if 
it joins the bank minus the :  fees),  with the present value of firm assets if it does not join the bank. 
Firms that require a large X  and m investment relative ro  the advantages they would receive from 
rapid access tojnance  through u banking reiutiunship will prefer autarky. 
7. By holding equity in the firm, the bank may also be able to exert influence over the firm’s 
future choice of a bank to  act as purchaser and underwriter of securities. Thus equity can help solve 267  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
duces financial distress costs for firms by reducing leverage, and by concentrat- 
ing ownership stakes (which reduces bargaining and coordination costs among 
creditors during distress). Also, in distress states, firms may need their banker 
to credibly signal that the firm’s prospects are good to other firm creditors. A 
bank’s willingness to exchange debt for equity in the firm during distress can 
be a strong signal of  the  bank’s confidence in the firm (Brown, James, and 
Mooradian 199  1). Several recent studies of Japanese banking have emphasized 
the advantages of stock ownership by banks as a means of promoting monitor- 
ing and reducing  costs of  financial distress.8 A final advantage of allowing 
equity finance is that this avoids potential conflicts of interest between the firm 
and its creditors. Reliance on debt can lead to an “underinvestment problem” 
(Myers  1977). Positive net present value (NPV) projects with relatively low 
risk may  not be undertaken on the margin  because  undertaking the project 
generates a transfer of wealth from the firm’s stockholders to its debtholders. 
Similarly, debt finance entices firms to substitute relatively high-risk assets for 
existing low-risk assets, since such substitution leads to a wealth transfer from 
creditors to stockholders. 
These advantages from equity contracting may be offset by costs associated 
with equity finance. If the riskiness of firms is unobservable, those who finance 
firms must charge all firms the same cost of finance. For good firms, this entails 
a lemons premium on their cost of finance. The premium will be largest for 
junior securities, since their payoffs are the riskiest (Myers and Majluf  1984). 
Also, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) and others have stressed, if managerial 
effort depends on managers’ stakes in the firm, or if management’s objectives 
conflict with shareholders’, then equity issues can reduce managerial incen- 
tives and encourage non-profit-maximizing behavior by  management (by re- 
ducing the concentration  of  ownership in the  firm, and hence the ability to 
discipline managers). 
Mayer’s (1988) time-inconsistency problem, in part, by  allowing banks to control firm financing 
decisions in the future. As argued below, there is little evidence for this sort of monopoly control 
by banks in Germany or the United States, at least after the 1890s. 
8. Sheard (1989) points out that a “main” bank’s debt position in a firm often takes a junior 
position to other debt effectively, and is written down during financial distress to avoid bankruptcy. 
Thus Japanese banks’ “equity” positions in firms are effectively larger than their balance-sheet 
statements would indicate. Kim (1992) finds that equity stakes by  Japanese banks are higher for 
growing firms with high external finance ratios and high risk. In Japan, the incidence of bankruptcy 
is much lower, and the costs of bankruptcy when it does occur are also much lower, than in the 
US. Kim  shows that these advantages in Japan depend on the ownership structure of  firms- 
specifically, the concentration of ownership in the firm (or equivalently, the proportion of the firm 
owned by banks). Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990b) find that firms with close ties to Japa- 
nese banks suffer much lower reduction in investment levels during periods of financial distress, 
but they do not find an effect from bank’s equity interest on the costs of financial distress once one 
has controlled for other characteristics of the firms’ financing sources. The upshot of their findings 
is that there are substitute means for achieving the desirable features of inside equity, which take 
the form of concentrating lending in the hands of few borrowers, or allowing banks to hold junior 
debt positions that have equitylike features. Further support for this interpretation comes from 
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Thus, reaping  the advantages  of  equity depends on constructing  mecha- 
nisms that provide adequate control over the firm’s management to avoid pro- 
hibitive lemons premiums and managerial incentive problems. Bankers may 
sit on corporate boards of directors and exert direct control over managerial 
decisions. This entails large fixed costs to the bank, which may be prohibitive 
for small firms with uncertain prospects. Alternatively, firms could avoid eq- 
uity issues and rely on debt. In this case, banks use debt covenants and short- 
term debt as a disciplinary device on management. Managers who behave im- 
properly will find their credit lines discontinued  by  the bank, through either 
the “calling” of the bank’s loan or the bank’s decision not to rollover its debt. 
As discussed below, the history of German universal banking-in  which both 
enforcement technologies were available to banks-suggests  that banks began 
lending to firms via protected short-term debt. Once the firm had matured and 
the bank had become an informed insider, both parties benefited from a conver- 
sion of short-term debt into equity finance. The transition from debt to equity 
finance also entailed  an increased  role of  the bank in controlling  corporate 
decision making through the board of directors. The life cycle of “corporate 
governance” arrangements  with intermediaries  parallels the life cycle of the 
firm’s financial structure. 
Thus, the economies of scope from a single intermediary being able to lend, 
hold equity, exert corporate discipline, and underwrite securities for a firm may 
be entirely  unrelated  to conventional  technological  economies of  scope (or 
transactions costs) in providing these services. Rather, the main advantages of 
allowing a single intermediary  to perform all these activities revolve around 
information and control economies. First, in the context of  the pecking-order 
approach outlined above, because lending to a firm precedes underwriting in 
the firm’s life cycle, a bank that has lent to the firm in the past will have access 
to private information that will reduce the costs of underwriting. Second, con- 
sistent with Mayer’s (1988) emphasis on time consistency, it may be important 
to allow the bank to hold equity and underwrite securities for the mature firm 
as an efficient means for the firm to pay for earlier bank investments in infor- 
mation  with capital gains on stock and underwriting fees at later dates when 
the firm’s cost of  funds is lower. Third, when banks take long-term positions 
in a firm, by lending or holding the equity of the firm, their signals as under- 
writers may be more credible. This is particularly  true  if  banks are allowed 
to hold equity; or alternatively, if the securities they underwrite are senior to 
preexisting claims on the firm.9 
9. It is possible that universal banking can involve a conflict of  interest. Banks with existing 
claims on a firm might use underwriting as a means of reducing losses on their existing claims on 
the firm by attracting outside investors, or, conversely, banks may discourage outside investors to 
keep a good-risk firm to themselves. These problems can be overcome if  banks  are allowed to 
have a stake in the securities they underwrite, or if the security being underwritten  is senior to the 
bank’s existing claim on the firm. For both of these reasons, it is important to allow banks to take 
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8.2.4  Universal Banking and Bank Concentration 
The recent  literature on commercial  banking  has  stressed  advantages of 
allowing banks to be large. A concentrated banking system permits greater 
portfolio diversification of banks and allows banks to coordinate their response 
to crises by forming credible mutual-insurance arrangements, which would not 
be possible in a system of many geographically isolated banks. These theoreti- 
cal propositions receive ample support from the comparative history of bank- 
ing systems and their performance (see Calomiris 1993 for a review). 
In the context of universal banking, there are further advantages to becoming 
a large bank operating a branching network.  First,  if  industrial firms find it 
advantageous to operate large-scale enterprises over a wide geographic area 
(as Chandler  1977 argues), then monitoring the activities of  the firm will be 
easier if a bank has similarly wide geographic scope. Second, large branching 
banks are better able to take advantage of long-term relationship economies of 
financing firms through a universal bank because of their access to both securi- 
ties purchasers and depositors. Unit banking laws that prohibit the establish- 
ment of deposit-taking branches effectively limit banks’ access to deposits on 
a large scale and, therefore, limit large-scale lending to firms. 
Furthermore, given the overhead costs of  setting up a bank office, restric- 
tions on commercial bank branching limit branching in securities retailing, too, 
and this raises the costs of bringing securities to market.’O Without access to a 
large number of securities purchasers, a bank may not be able to internalize all 
the benefits of collecting information about issuing firms’ prospects and about 
the ultimate demand for firms’ securities. The lack of  retail branching  also 
creates transactions and signaling costs associated with setting up networks of 
banks that collect and credibly transmit  such information. Finally, branching 
reduces the physical cost of  distributing securities.” Riesser (191 1, 756-57) 
writes that the German banks are “able to find a wider and safer market for the 
sale of securities which [they] proposed to float. [They] can, therefore, acquire 
such securities on a larger scale and with greater confidence, knowing before- 
hand that such securities will go into good hands as permanent investments, 
and not be thrown back at once upon the market, to be taken up again by the 
bank.” Riesser also argues that large-scale banking concentrates voting power 
(proxies from trust accounts), which can be useful  for disciplining manage- 
10.  Implicit in this argument are the realistic assumptions that the depositors and holders of 
trust accounts required a branch to be located near them, and that depositors were not indifferent 
to holding claims on banks in nontransactable form: otherwise, unit banking laws would not have 
been a binding constraint. 
11, White (1985) argues that  economies of  scale and scope in providing investment banking 
and trust activities, as well as the nonbank corporate merger wave, encouraged bank mergers in the 
1920s. Peach (1941, 86) notes that affiliates often operated large branching networks, nationally or 
internationally. These networks no doubt reduced transactions costs of placing issues: however, 
they were not substitutes for full-fledged branch banking, which involves the taking of deposits, 
clearing of checks, management of trust accounts, and placing of securities within the same organ- 
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ment  of  firms banks  finance.  Jeidels  (1905,  164-76)  argues  that  industry- 
specific knowledge was important in evaluating the creditworthiness of  Ger- 
man firms, and that economies of information gathering encouraged concen- 
tration and specialization by underwriters in particular industry niches. 
Commentators on the emergence of some large-scale universal banking in 
the United States in the 1920s noted that one of the chief advantages of  securi- 
ties affiliates of commercial banks relative to investment banks was their larger 
size, which was due to their large branching networks. Chicago’s growth as an 
investment-banking center in the 1920s was encouraged by  the growth of  re- 
gional correspondent relations centering in Chicago, which increased the de- 
posit  and  securities  accounts  managed  by  Chicago  commercial  banks  op- 
erating investment banking affiliates (Bureau of Business Research 1928, 40). 
Preston and Finlay (1930a, 1154) argue that American investors were more 
confident of  securities underwritten by  a single bank, since concentration of 
underwriting “centers responsibility” for the issue in one bank. They also argue 
that research into the creditworthiness of a firm “must involve more than sim- 
ply a study of statistics: it must include continuous contact with the manage- 
ment of companies whose equities are selected.” These large fixed costs imply 
that stock offerings and underwriters’ resources must be large. 
Despite the  advantages of  concentration  for universal  banks,  regulations 
limiting branch banking made large-scale universal banking impossible. Long 
before  the  1914 Clayton  Act restrictions on bank involvement on corporate 
boards or the  1933 Glass-Steagall restrictions on universal banking activities, 
branching restrictions hampered the development of long-term relationships 
between firms and banks and made large-scale underwritings by  commercial 
banks very rare. In the United States, after Jay Cooke’s bond campaign to fi- 
nance the Union during the Civil War, underwriting syndicates relied on a com- 
plex hierarchy of banks and brokers to coordinate securities transactions. This 
network became an important vehicle for funding underwriting, defining secu- 
rities holders’ demand schedules (to set prices and determine types of securi- 
ties  underwritten),  and  distributing  securities  once they  were  underwritten 
(Carosso  1970). The network  of interbank relationships established for this 
purpose was an important financial innovation of the post-Civil  War era. Nev- 
ertheless, in the absence of regulations prohibiting  branching and consolida- 
tion across states, such coordination of  information could have been accom- 
plished (as in Germany) within syndicates of a few nationwide banks, with far 
fewer transactions, and with stronger incentives to collect accurate information 
about  firms’  prospects  and  securities  holders’  demands.  This  system  also 
would have enhanced control over the management of public firms by concen- 
trating voting rights in the hands of a few agents. 
8.2.5  Diversification and Universal Banking 
My discussion of  universal banking has focused on corporate-finance cost 
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universal banking system. Much of the current discussion of the economies of 
allowing universal banking has focused on a different issue. Empirical studies 
of  the United  States in the post-World  War  I1 era have examined primarily 
the potential  benefits of  diversification that would come from combining the 
activities of commercial and investment banks, as well as other intermediaries. 
Diversification lessens the chance of costly liquidation of  intermediaries and 
reduces  transactions  costs  of  constructing  diversified  portfolios  for  wealth 
holders. Some of these studies examine the relative performance of firms with 
diverse activities (Meinster and Johnson 1979; Boyd and Graham 1986; Litan 
1985; 1987, 105-11;  Wall 1987; Brewer 1989), while others consider random 
combinations of firms actually pursuing separate activities (Boyd and Graham 
1988; Litan 1987, 112-18;  Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt  1988; Brewer, Fortier, 
and Pave1 1988). The results from this literature have been mixed, though on 
balance they indicate small benefits of diversification. Not only do these stud- 
ies focus too narrowly on the issue of portfolio structure, but by design they 
are ill-suited to measure the portfolio-diversification advantages of  universal 
banking. 
The studies of  random, counterfactual combinations of  different activities 
suffer from the obvious problem that combining firms is not the same as com- 
bining  balance  sheets. The behavior  of  financial  firms might change as the 
result of combining activities; indeed, this underlies the arguments of econo- 
mies of scope outlined above. But even the studies that analyze the compara- 
tive performance of actual combinations of  financial activities will understate 
the  potential  diversification  advantages from universal  banking for two rea- 
sons. First, the observed combinations have occurred in the existing regulatory 
environment, in which many potentially beneficial combinations are prohibited 
by  law.  Second, universal  banking  might enlarge  the feasible  set of  traded 
assets in the economy in ways that cannot be observed under the current regula- 
tory regime. 
Obviously, a better measure of the diversification benefits  from universal 
banking  would  examine  diversification  opportunities  across  regulatory  re- 
gimes, and within regimes that permitted universal banking. In the latter cate- 
gory, White’s (1986) findings for the United States in the 1920s are of interest. 
National banks  with securities affiliates had lower risk of failure than other 
banks.  This may  reflect greater portfolio opportunities for banks that could 
establish credible long-term relationships with borrowers. White also found 
that securities affiliates reduced the overall risk to bank stockholders, since the 
incomes from affiliates and parent banks were uncorrelated. 
In a series of  interesting studies, Tilly (1980,  1984, 1986, 1992) analyzes 
the risk-return characteristics of the portfolios created by Germany’s universal 
banks in the pre-World  War I era, and compares them with a constructed “ef- 
ficient” portfolio (the efficient frontier of  risk-return tradeoffs available). He 
finds German  universal  banks’  portfolios  remarkably  close  to  the  efficient 
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of some (e.g., Neuburger and Stokes 1974; Gerschenkron  1962, 15) that Ger- 
man banks may have preferred  some industries over others for reasons un- 
related to efficient capital allocation. 
Cross-regime comparisons  for this  period  are  also possible.  Tilly  (1  984, 
1986, 1992) and Kennedy and Britton (1985) compare British (nonuniversal) 
and German bank portfolios for the pre-World  War I period. They argue that 
British  portfolios were  much more distant from the efficient frontier of  the 
British economy and far inferior to Germany in the risk-return tradeoffs they 
achieved. 
The results  of  the studies of Germany and Britain are controversial,  since 
they rely on rather heroic assumptions to measure both the efficient portfolio 
frontier and the portfolio created by the banks. But they draw attention to the 
importance of a universal banking system’s ability to produce, not merely to 
combine, investment  opportunities. As Tilly  (1986,  117; 1992) emphasizes, 
and as is too often ignored in the empirical studies of diversification from com- 
bining  banking  activities  in  the  United  States  today, the  banking  system’s 
achievement of an efficient portfolio in Germany did not merely reflect wise 
choices by passive money managers of the portfolio weights to attach to a set 
of exogenously given investment opportunities. The German banking system, 
with its ability to economize on a variety of  costs, was essential to making 
investment opportunities available to the market, and hence to expanding the 
feasible portfolio frontier. Opportunities for efficient construction of portfolios 
through  universal  banking depended  on the ability of the  banks  to mitigate 
information, control, and transaction costs (Tilly 1992, 110). 
8.2.6  Criticisms of Universal Banking 
Perspectives on universal banking have not always been favorable. Histori- 
cally, in the United States, there has been substantial opposition to allowing 
both the concentration of banking and the combination of commercial lending, 
underwriting, and equity holding by financial intermediaries. Indeed, as will 
be discussed in section 8.3, for most of the period prior to the legal separation 
of commercial and investment banking in  1933, which forced the closing of 
state-chartered underwriting affiliates of commercial banks, lending and un- 
derwriting were performed mainly by  different intermediaries. In particular, 
because banks typically were not allowed to branch or merge, they could not 
take advantage of the economies from internalizing the functions of the securi- 
ties  marketing  network  within  a  single  intermediary.  Changes  in  bank 
branching and consolidation permitted in the 1920s were an important precon- 
dition for the encroachments made by commercial banks into investment bank- 
ing in the 1920s. 
Thus, the time-honored tradition  of  American restrictions on the scale of 
banking effectively limited universal banking prior to Glass-Steagall in  1933. 
The  outright  prohibitions  on  investment  banking  affiliates  of  commercial 
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accused of taking advantage of conflicts of interest in securities dealings. Sec- 
ond, it was claimed that links between affiliates and parent banks contributed 
to the banking collapse of the Great Depression. 
Scholars who have investigated these claims have found no supporting em- 
pirical evidence, and have disputed them on theoretical and empirical grounds 
(Carosso 1970; White  1986; Benston  1989; Kaufman and Mote  1989, 1990; 
Kroszner and Rajan  1994). On the question of  whether affiliates weakened 
banks,  White (1986) found that national banks with  securities affiliates had 
lower failure propensities, and he linked these to diversification  advantages. 
White also pointed  out that,  as documented  in  Peach  1941, affiliates  were 
wholly owned by banks, and thus strategies to strengthen affiliates at the ex- 
pense of parent banks would not have been chosen knowingly by management. 
Benston (1989) argues that the presumed link between bank failures and 
securities activities of affiliates, on which much of the reasoning of the various 
banking committees relied, never received careful scrutiny in any of the many 
congressional “studies” of banking from 193  1 to 1940. Nevertheless, this pre- 
sumption underlay  the  drastic changes  of  the  separation of  investment  and 
commercial banking in the Banking Act of 1933. 
Conflicts of intemt are unlikely to occur. In equilibrium, investment bank- 
ers-whether  operating out of private investment banking houses or national 
bank affiliates-will  not be able to attract customers if they cannot credibly 
signal the  quality  of  securities they underwrite.  If  bank affiliates could not 
overcome potential investors’ concerns over conflicts of interest (for example, 
by purchasing or managing some of the new issues, then they would lose busi- 
ness to private investment banks. The fact that affiliates were able to provide 
underwriting services on a large scale for many years in open competition with 
other underwriters indicates that conflicts of interest were not significant. Evi- 
dence against conflict of interest is provided by Kroszner and Rajan (1994). 
They analyze default costs for bonds issued by affiliates and their competitors 
prior  to  Glass-Steagall  and  conclude  that  the  performance  of  affiliate- 
underwritten securities of a given ex ante class was at least as good as that of 
securities underwritten by their competitors. 
Two other common criticisms of universal banking are that it increases in- 
efficient bank rent extraction from firms, and encourages the development of 
industrial cartels. Coordination, of course, is not always efficient. In a concen- 
trated banking system where firms have exclusive relationships with intermedi- 
aries, would collusion among banks in setting fees and interest rates increase 
the cost of finance in the economy? And would close corporate monitoring and 
control, along with long-term relationships between firms and universal banks, 
encourage the development of  industrial cartels by  providing  a credible en- 
forcement mechanism for collusive behavior within industries? 
On the first point, it is doubtful that universal banking raises financing costs 
by allowing banks to extract greater rent from firms. As Rajan (1992a) shows, 
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about firms may give banks access only to quasi rents (which are transferred 
back to the firm ex ante). The interesting question is whether universal banking 
will increase or decrease the distortions that come from asymmetric informa- 
tion. Here the point to emphasize is not the extent of quasi or true rents, but 
the way they are extracted. As argued above, universal banking may be benefi- 
cial for solving the time-inconsistency problem because it allows banks to reap 
long-term gains from large initial costs of  investing in information. Thus, for 
example, banks will be able to “charge” for underwriting services partly by 
relying on long-term gains from their relationship with firms. In the absence 
of universal banking, banks may have to recover costs over a shorter horizon. 
This will  require  “front-loading’’ of  financing costs,  which will  distort the 
firm’s investment decision by  making finance excessively costly in the near 
term. Thus, if universal banking allows banks to design compensation schemes 
that eliminate such distortions, then even if it increases the share of firms’ rents 
that accrue to banks (as opposed to firms’ entrepreneurs), this rent extraction 
may be relatively efficient. Empirical evidence (De Long 1991 ;  Ramirez 1992) 
discussed below suggests that banking relationships added value to firms, and 
that  investment  bankers’  fees reflected  costs  of  providing  information  and 
transaction services, rather than simply rents.12 
On the question whether investment banks promoted inefficient industrial 
cartels, two points are worth emphasizing. First, the development and enforce- 
ment of industrial cartels by intermediaries is not a weakness peculiar to con- 
centrated universal banking systems. Indeed, such accusations were the hall- 
mark of the Pujo committee hearings of 1912-13 in the United States (Carosso 
1970, chap. 6).  According to his critics, J. P.  Morgan managed to exert as much 
control over “other people’s money” in the context of the fragmented American 
banking system as would a universal bank in a concentrated banking industry. 
According to Louis Brandeis and Samuel Untermyer, Morgan oversaw a com- 
plex “money trust” involving corporate boards of  directors dominated by  in- 
vestment  bankers  who  effectively  enforced  collusion  among  firms,  limited 
competition by  commercial banks (which were controlled by the investment 
bankers as well), and extracted rents for investment banking firms. From this 
jaundiced  perspective,  bankers’  corporate-control  services  were  really  just 
selling protection, Mafia-style  (Brandeis  19 14). With respect to the German 
experience, Riesser (191  1) argues that bank involvement in firms was neither 
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for enforcing cartels. Riesser claims that 
the influence of the banks was “decisive in some cases, less so in others, and 
12. A separate question is whether the universal bank’s possibly higher share of its client firms’ 
rents  will  discourage entrepreneurial investment.  Universal  bankers should  vary the amount of 
rent, and the variables on which it depends, to ensure that the entrepreneur receives his reservation 
level of rent, and that the entrepreneur’s incentives will be minimally distorted by rent extraction. 
In other words, a perfectly discriminating monopolistic banker with access to a “lump-sum tax” 
will not discourage entrepreneurial investment. Indeed, if  universal banks are better able to gauge 
the total rents of the firm because of better information, then they will make fewer mistakes than 
other intermediaries in determining how much rent to extract from entrepreneurs. 275  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
hardly perceptible  in  some cases” (7 12). Notably, in the  chemical industry, 
industrial cartels were enforced  with great apparent success despite the ab- 
sence of bank involvement (721-25).  Jeidels (1905, 199-252) provides a much 
more detailed accounting of the role of German banks in industrial cartels. He 
argues that banks focused on individual customers and were not instigators in 
organizing cartels. Only after firms moved to establish cartels did banks assist 
in enforcing arrangements so made. Both German and American history shows 
that bank discipline was not  a unique means of  enforcing industrial cartels. 
Policies other than prohibitions on universal banking are likely to be superior 
for facilitating competition within industries. 
Second, it is not clear that an important or primary function of German uni- 
versal banks or the American “money trust” was the enforcement of inefficient 
industrial  cartel^.'^ There have been many recent challenges to the notion that 
the Morgan syndicate was exclusively or mainly a device for extracting rent. 
Carosso (1970) and Huertas and Cleveland (1  987) dispute the “findings” of the 
hjo  committee, arguing that investment banking was a competitive, contesta- 
ble business. Entry was not blocked, and firms in need of finance did not feel 
compelled  to use the same investment  banker repeatedly.  There was active 
competition for business, and repeated contacts reflected economies of infor- 
mation. If these authors are right, it follows that attempts by banks to restrict 
competition within industries would have encouraged entry by intermediaries 
to finance competing industrial firms. With respect to Germany, even Alexan- 
der Gerschenkron, a staunch advocate of the notion that banks enforced indus- 
trial cartels during the period of  early industrialization, argued that this was 
not possible after  1900 because of ease of entry into banking (1962, 15, 21, 
88-89,  139). Jeidels (1905, 122-30),  Whale (1930, 35), and Tilly (1992, 109) 
support this view, arguing that German banking was a competitive industry 
after 1890, particularly in financing large, mature industrial firms. 
Quantitative studies have been helpful, but not conclusive, in resolving the 
question of whether industrial cartel enforcement was historically an important 
13. To the extent cartels were inefficient in Germany, it was through monopolistic restriction of 
output. Another possible inefficiency associated with cartels-lack  of innovation-does  not seem 
to have been relevant in Germany. Indeed, Webb (1980) argues to the contrary that cartelization 
of the steel industry encouraged innovation. Furthermore, the ability to solve information problems 
efficiently is especially important to spurring innovation, as Schumpeter (1  939), Butters and Lin- 
tner (1945), and many others have recognized. Here, too, German industry was at a distinct advan- 
tage, as the discussion in section 8.3 will show. Tilly (1982) also points out that acquisitions within 
industries by best-practice producers were frequent, and this too can be credited to financing elas- 
ticity. Financing new ideas quickly may have increased competition within industries and quickly 
driven out inefficient firms. One should exercise caution in interpreting comparisons of the rate of 
start-up of new firms in the United States and Germany as a measure of  innovativeness (and costs 
of cartels). New firms may have been more necessary to innovation in the United States because 
of a lack of corporate discipline, exercised in part through intermediaries (Berle and Means 1932). 
As the record of post-World  War I1 Japan shows, innovativeness can be  a feature of relatively 
concentrated industries, particularly if  the  management of  firms in  those industries are “disci- 
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function of intermediaries. De Long (1991) finds that the presence of a Morgan 
partner on a firm’s board of directors increased the value of the firm’s common 
stock by  30 percent. More importantly, he traces this increase in stock value to 
the superior earnings performance of Morgan companies: “The Morgan part- 
nership and its peers saw themselves-and  other participants saw them-as 
filling a crucial ‘monitoring’ and ‘signaling’ intermediary role between firms 
and investors in a world where information about firms’ underlying values and 
the quality of  their managers was scarce.. . . The presence of  Morgan’s men 
meant that when a firm got into trouble-whether  because of ‘excessive com- 
petition’ or management mistakes-action  would be taken  to restore profit- 
ability” (1991, 209). De Long shows that investment banking firms were not 
simply vehicles for extracting rent, but he is not able to distinguish whether 
investment bankers increased the productivity of firms, or simply helped firms 
by  eliminating their competition. “[Tlhe relative roles of monopoly and effi- 
ciency in the ‘Morganization premium’ cannot be determined in a fashion con- 
vincing enough to overcome prior beliefs” (224-25).  Another recent study, by 
Ramirez (1  992), connects Morgan involvement with increases in the elasticity 
of credit supply for firms. Ramirez finds similar advantages in reducing cash- 
flow sensitivity of  investment for German firms with universal banking con- 
nections. While these studies show that at least some of Morgan’s contribution, 
and those of German universal banks, involved a credit relationship with the 
firm, they do not refute the notion that banks helped their clients by limiting 
competition  within  industry. Indeed, by  giving  client firms “deep pockets,” 
Morgan may have helped them effectively threaten competitors with potential 
price wars. 
In sum, the role of  intermediaries  in developing  and enforcing industrial 
cartels remains a murky area in economic history. But to the extent such accu- 
sations have been made, they apply more broadly to the problems of all forms 
of interbank coalitions (notably to the American “money trust”) and are not a 
peculiar feature of a concentrated universal banking system. Clearly, eliminat- 
ing industrial cartels requires  more draconian  measures than  restrictions on 
universal  banking. These would include limits on cooperation, communica- 
tion, and oversight among firms, banks, and securities dealers. Some of these 
were adopted in the United States as early as the  189Os, culminating in the 
19  14 Clayton Act prohibitions on interlocking directorates, the  1933 separa- 
tion of  commercial and investment banking, and the new trend toward frag- 
mentation of both investment banking and commercial banking under the re- 
strictive  regulations  of  the  New  Deal.  To  the  extent  that  these  changes 
undermined monitoring and control networks, such drastic action  may  have 
caused more problems than  it solved, by  increasing financing costs of  firms 
and by allowing firms’ managers to escape the discipline of their stockholders 
and the marketplace (Berle and Means  1932; De Long  1991; Calomiris and 
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American comparison in section 8.3 is that allowing a concentrated universal 
banking in the United States during the pre-World  War I era would have had 
little marginal effect on industrial cartelization. 
8.2.7  Summary 
This review of general perspectives on universal banlung has argued that 
there are significant advantages of allowing banks to combine lending, equity 
holding, underwriting, trust activities, and deposit taking in the same interme- 
diary, and thus significant costs to restricting  this combination of activities. 
The advantages of universal banking arise from a combination of three factors. 
First, the corporate financial life cycle (or pecking order) entails a progression 
in which a firm’s external financing evolves from short-term debt directly held 
by banks to widely held equity finance underwritten by banks. The optimal 
form of corporate finance and governance changes as firms become seasoned. 
Initially, banks  discipline firms and limit their exposure to risk  by  holding 
short-term senior debt. As firms become seasoned, they come to rely on junior 
claims for their financing needs, and intermediaries underwriting firms’ stock 
issues protect their interests by exercising direct control over firms through 
boards of directors. Second, there are economies of establishing long-term re- 
lationships between firms and intermediaries that revolve around the reusabil- 
ity of information and the smoothing of costs of external finance over the firm’s 
life cycle (which may only be possible within the context of a long-term rela- 
tionship). 
Together, firms’ changing financial needs over the life cycle and the advan- 
tages of long-term relationships between firms and intermediaries imply bene- 
fits to allowing intermediaries to engage in both underwriting and lending. A 
universal bank’s ability to provide funds to firms at low cost requires a third 
factor-that  the bank be allowed to operate a network of branches for collect- 
ing  deposits  and  placing  and  managing  securities.  Widespread  branching 
allows banks to diversify when making large loans to customers. It also econo- 
mizes on information and transactions costs of placing and managing securi- 
ties. The costs of credibly communicating the condition of  firms to outsiders, 
and of gauging the market demand for new securities issues, are particularly 
large for equity issues. Large-scale universal banking reduces these costs by 
placing a single intermediary between ultimate holders and securities issuers. 
True universal banking allows banks to combine underwriting, lending, trust 
activities, and deposit taking within a single branching intermediary. Thus, de- 
spite the fact that national banks operated investment banking and trust affili- 
ates in the  1920s, true universal banking never was permitted in the United 
States because  of  limitations  on branching  that effectively  limited a bank’s 
direct access to funds, and hence its ability to finance large-scale industry. 
The next section is devoted to measuring German-American differences in 
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the advantages of universal banking. I argue that the absence of universal bank- 
ing in the  United  States, and its presence  in Germany, resulted  in different 
methods and higher costs of  financing American industrialization in the pre- 
World War I period. 
8.3  Banking and Finance in Germany and America, 1870-1914 
By the outbreak of World War I, Germany and the United States had devel- 
oped financial systems that bore little resemblance to one another. The role of 
banks in corporate finance and corporate control, the types of financial instru- 
ments that dominated the scene, the way financial instruments were underwrit- 
ten and sold, the combinations of activities that banks performed, and the fi- 
nancial structure of industrial firms and banks differed sharply between the two 
countries. This section reviews these differences in detail along dimensions 
suggested in section 8.2, focusing on consequences for the cost of industrial 
finance. The evidence suggests substantially higher costs of industrial finance 
in the United States. 
In  light of  these differences, I describe and attempt to explain  the “inver- 
sion” that took  place from  1850 to World War  I  in German  and  American 
financial institutions. American financial institutions circa 1850, like their Ger- 
man counterparts circa 1900, played a much greater role in industrial finance, 
especially in New England’s early industrialization. In antebellum New Eng- 
land, a financial system flourished that bore much resemblance to the mature 
German  system. The German  financial  system circa  1850 was  more  frag- 
mented and less integrated than New England’s, but rapidly progressed  after 
1870, and quickly developed a concentrated universal banking system. At the 
same time, New England’s financial system moved away from its early struc- 
ture, and from financing industrial activities of those closely involved with the 
banks. The “regressive” history of American banking from 1850 to  1920 re- 
flected the increasing scale of industrial borrowers and their credit needs and 
the restrictions on  bank branching and consolidation, which kept banks’ size 
and geographical scope small while the size and scope of their customers grew. 
These restrictions on U.S. banks prevented them from reaping advantages of 
universal  banking long before the separation of commercial and investment 
banking in 1933. 
8.3.1  Relative Factor Intensity and Capital Scarcity in 
U.S. and German Industrialization 
The second industrial revolution, beginning in the mid-nineteenth  century, 
saw rapid industrial expansion especially in the areas of railroads, steel, chemi- 
cals, and electricity. Germany and the United States were among the most im- 
pressive examples of industrial growth during this period, although Germany’s 
heyday of industrial expansion began later than that of the United States. As 
table 8.1 shows, in the United States, nonagricultural output grew most rapidly Table 8.1  Nonagricultural Growth in Germany and the United States 
Germany  United States 
Nonagricultural NNP  Nonagricultural VA  Nonagricultural NI 
1913 Prices  Nonagricultural Labor  1879 Prices  I869 Prices  Nonagricultural Labor 












1,550  5,325  6,193 
8,43  I 
8,796 
15,857  12,807 
37,210  20,267 
7,543  12,540 
16,519  20,87 I 
Sources; Real nonagricultural activity in the United States was calculated using value added in mining, manufacturing, and 
construction for  1849-69,  from Gallman, as reported in  U.S. Department of Commerce 1975, 239. For  1869-1913,  I used 
Martin’s data on current national income outside of agriculture (U.S. Department of  Commerce  1975, 240), deflated by  a 
nonagricultural output deflator. This deflator was consructed as follows. Romer’s (1989,22) GNP deflator is assumed to equal 
a weighted average of the nonagricultural deflator and the agricultural deflator (from Warren and Pearson for 1869-1 890 and 
BLS for 1890 to 1910-13,  as reported in U.S. Department of Commerce 1975, 200-201,  using Martin’s weights for agricul- 
tural and nonagricultural income. For Germany, nonagricultural net national product and labor are derived from Hoffmann 
1965,205,454-55. 
Notes; NNP = net national product; VA  = value added; NI  = national income. 280  Charles W.  Calomiris 
from 1850 to 1870, while in Germany rapid growth was more concentrated in 
the period from 1870 to the First World War. In the United States, value added 
in manufacturing, mining, and construction more than doubled from 1849 to 
1869. Nonagricultural income grew by less than half from 1869 to 1889 and 
doubled from 1890 to 1913. In Germany, nonagricultural net product increased 
by less than half from 1850 to 1870, then doubled from 1870 to 1890 and more 
than doubled from 1890 to 1913. 
Despite the similarity in nonagricultural output growth rates in Germany 
and the United States from 1870 to 1913, the way  growth was achieved was 
quite different. In the United States, employment in the nonagricultural sector 
grew by  the same rate as output, while in Germany nonagricultural employ- 
ment grew at half the rate of output. Relative to Germany, American industrial- 
ization relied more intensively on labor. 
Goldsmith (1985) defines three capital-to-output ratios, using broad, inter- 
mediate, and narrow definitions of capital. The intermediate measure excludes 
land, and the narrow measure also excludes consumer durables and residential 
structures. A comparison for all three measures, for Germany and the United 
States at selected dates from 1850 to 1913, is provided in table 8.2. The Ger- 
man capital-to-output ratio is substantially higher than that of the United States 
regardless of  which measure is chosen, but the proportionate difference be- 
tween the United States and Germany is greatest for the narrow  measure, 
which focuses on the reproducible capital of producers. On average, from 1850 
to 1913, the U.S. narrow capital-to-output ratio is half that of Germany.14 
Field (1983, 1987) and Wright (1990) have emphasized the reliance placed 
by the United States on substitutes for fixed capital in the production process, 
especially natural resources. As Cain and Paterson (198  1) document, materials 
prices fell sharply in the United States after the Civil War. Continuing discover- 
ies of new resources, especially metals and oil fields, kept resource costs low 
throughout the pre-World  War I period. Wright (1990, 658) notes that U.S. 
exports had far higher resource content than imports and that the resource in- 
tensity of exports increased substantially during late-nineteenth-century indus- 
trialization. By 1928, resource intensity of exports was 50 percent higher than 
its 1879 level. Wright follows Piore and Sabel (1984) and Williamson (1980) 
in linking the American utilization of  resources with the “high-throughput’’ 
system of manufacture emphasized by  Chandler (1977), which Field (1987) 
points out is a means to economize on capital costs. Wright and others also 
emphasize that the reliance on resources in the United States was not exoge- 
nously determined. America’s natural resource base is not among the richest 
in the world. Rather, the American reliance on natural resources, the develop- 
14. The capital  intensity of  the German economy in  1850 cannot be  attributed to  universal 
banking, since universal banking under limited liability laws began in  1870. Centralized govem- 
ment subsidization and planning of railroads, built ahead of demand, may account for the large 
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Table 8.2  Ratios of Capital to GNP 
Intermediate Capital 
Narrow Capital Measure  Measure  Broad Capital Measure 
United States  Germany  United States  Germany  United States  Germany 
1850  1.24  4.20  1.66  5.04  2.83  9.29 
1875  3.29  4.26  7.12 
1880  1.78  2.45  3.56 
1895  2.70  3.79  5.68 
1900  1.81  2.91  4.56 
1912  1.71  2.69  4.17 
1913  3.42  4.82  6.58 
~~~~  ~ 
Source: Goldsmith 1985, 39-42. 
Notes: Narrow capital is nonresidential structures, equipment, inventories, and livestock.  Interme- 
diate capital is narrow measure plus residential structures and consumer durables. Broad capital is 
intermediate measure plus land. 
Table 8.3  Components of Tangible Reproducible Assets 
Germany (1913)  United States (1912) 
(%I  (%) 
Dwellings  25 
Other structures  31 
Equipment  26 
Inventories  10 
Livestock  5 
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ment of production techniques that were resource intensive, and the emergence 
of high-throughput production and distribution processes were induced in part 
by the high cost of raising capital. 
Goldsmith’s (1985) breakdown of the components of the capital stock also 
provides interesting evidence about differences between the United States and 
Germany in the allocation of capital across different uses. Table 8.3 compares 
the shares of various components of tangible reproducible assets for Germany 
in 1913 and the United States in 1912. The shares of livestock, inventories, and 
structures are quite similar. The principal difference is the relative importance 
of  equipment and consumer durables. In Germany, equipment is 26 percent 
of reproducible assets, while in the United States, it is half that percentage. 
Conversely, in the United States, consumer durables account for 13 percent of 
the total, while  in  Germany they make up only 3 percent.  Comparisons for 
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Germany  the relative  importance  of  equipment  in  reproducible  assets  grew 
during the pre-World  War I era. 
While there are many possible  interpretations of  the different weights for 
equipment in Germany and the United  States, two points warrant emphasis. 
First,  the greater relative  weight  in Germany  is unlikely to be  the result  of 
measurement error. Both countries’ data are derived from the same individual’s 
work-Goldsmith  1955-56,  1976; and  Goldsmith,  Lipsey, and  Mendelson 
1963. Thus, gross incomparabilities across categories or insensitivity  to data 
source differences are unlikely to explain the differences. One problem worth 
worrying about is whether the German data on equipment include items that 
would have been excluded from consumer durables in Germany, but included 
in consumer durables in  the United  States. I examined the items included in 
U.S. consumer durables to see whether production equipment located at home 
might explain the observed differences. Goldsmith (1955-56,  1  :680) reports 
nonfarm individuals’ expenditures on the main categories of consumer durable 
goods. These categories include “furniture, household  appliances, house fur- 
nishings, china etc., musical instruments, books, passenger cars, passenger car 
accessories, medical appliances,  and  miscellaneous.”  None  of  these  sounds 
like production equipment. Even if “household appliances” or “miscellaneous” 
includes some producer durables, these constitute such a small share of total 
consumer durables (16 percent in  1913) that they could not account for the 
difference between German and American equipment shares. 
The second point to emphasize, in anticipation of the discussion that fol- 
lows, is that the greater reliance on equipment in Germany is consistent with a 
lower cost of financing industrial expansion, particularly in the form of large- 
scale factory production.’5 Equipment-intensive production is more capital in- 
tensive because of its lower “throughput” rate (Field  1987). Also, equipment 
is less liquid than materials, which makes it harder to collateralize and finance. 
8.3.2  Interregional and Intersectoral Capital Allocation in the United States 
The cost of  capital was not uniform within the United States across loca- 
tions, sectors, or time.  Interregional and intersectoral differences in rates of 
return on capital in the United States (a measure of inefficiency in capital allo- 
cation) were largest during the mid-  to late nineteenth century. But even as 
late as the 1920s, Federal Reserve surveys show that interest rates on like bank 
loans in provincial  U.S. cities could be 4 or 5  percent  higher than  rates in 
eastern financial centers (Riefler 1930,79). Breckenridge (1 899, 5) contrasted 
the enormous interregional variation in low-risk U.S. interest rates with those 
of  European  countries, including Germany. For Germany, he cites evidence 
that the interest rates in 260 provincial towns were identical to those charged 
15. It is also interesting to note that the production of  producer durables is relatively capital 
intensive. Creamer  and  Borenstein  (1960,  52) show that  the  capital-output  ratios  of  capital- 
equipment industries were  I .05 in 1900, compared to 0.68 for consumption-goods industries. 283  The Costs of  Rejecting Universal Banking 
in Berlin for loans of a standard quality. As Bodenhorn (1992) shows, the ante- 
bellum United  States did  not  suffer from large  interregional differences  in 
costs of funds. The integration of capital markets seems to have worsened dur- 
ing the geographical expansion and industrialization of the postbellum era. In 
their  study of  the profitability  of  American enterprises  from  1850 to  1880, 
Atack and Bateman ( 1992) find that interregional profit-rate differentials in the 
United States were largest in the industrial sector, that industrial profit rates 
were far above profit rates in other sectors, and that convergence in profit rates 
for manufacturing was most protracted. They attribute this to capital immobil- 
ity across regions and across sectors that kept the capital stock of manufactur- 
ing enterprises low. 
8.3.3 
Qualitative  discussions of the  importance  of  German  banks  to industrial 
progress  date  from  Jeidels  1905,  Riesser  1911,  Schumpeter  1939,  and 
Gerschenkron 1962. Goldsmith (1985) provides detailed comparative analyses 
of many countries, and quantitative measures of important features of German 
finance from an international comparative perspective. Goldsmith ( 1958) and 
Goldsmith,  Lipsey, and  Mendelson  (1963)  analyze  the  funding  sources  of 
American industrialization in detail. 
Goldsmith  (1985,  135) defines  the  “financial  intermediation  ratio”  as a 
rough, general measure of  the economy’s reliance on intermediation for the 
creation of wealth. The financial intermediation ratio for Germany rose from 
20.3 in 1850 to 30.1 in 1913. Over this same period, the U.S. ratio rose from 
12.5 to 21.3. By this measure, the United States was fifth from the lowest in a 
field of thirteen, while Germany was near the top. Seven nations had ratios in 
excess of  29 for 1913, and the average ratio for twelve nations (excluding the 
outlier, India, with a ratio of 8) was 27. 
If one focuses on the specific links between bank lending and industrializa- 
tion, the contrast between the roles of banks in Germany and the United States 
is greater. In Germany, the universal banks were responsible for providing  a 
large share of industrial finance. The financing of industrial credit involved 
some  four  hundred  joint-stock  banks  operating  more  than  one  thousand 
branches nationwide by  1913. Eleven large incorporated banks accounted for 
more than one-third of the capital and assets of the system. Banks lent directly 
to firms through very short-term overdraft accounts (with average maturities of 
less than one month), held and managed stocks and bonds of firms, and acted 
as investment bankers for firms’ securities issues. The importance of universal 
banking  in  German  industrial  finance  was  especially  pronounced  after the 
1890s’ consolidation movement in banking, which Jeidels ( 1905, 83-107)  ar- 
gues largely reflected the increasingly large-scale financing needs of industry. 
Consistent with section 8.2’s discussion of the changing role of  universal 
banks over the life cycle of the firm, new projects were often financed directly 
through short-term bank loans. Later, financing was transformed to long-term 
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securities, placed by the bank that had originally made the loan (Jeidels 1905, 
109-22; Riesser 1911, 364-69;  Whale 1930, 37-38;  Eistert 1970, 91). Jeidels 
(1905) provides a detailed accounting of the involvement of banks over the life 
cycle of firms. The first stage of the firm-bank relationship saw keen competi- 
tion  among banks  in the loan  market for overdraft credit accounts  (Jeidels 
1905, 122). Interest costs for overdraft credit were typically set at the interbank 
lending rate plus 1 percent (Whale 1930, 37-38).  In the early stages of the firm 
life cycle, the bank’s main lever of influence over the firm was the threat of 
revoking the line of credit. Jeidels (126) cites as an example of bank discipline 
a  1901 letter the Dresdner Bank wrote to one of  its customers, threatening 
cancellation of credit if an upcoming vote by  the board of  directors went the 
wrong way.  As the firm-bank relationship  matured, equity took the place of 
overdraft credit and the bank’s  role in corporate governance changed  from 
threatening the board of  directors to becoming part of the board of directors 
(Jeidels  1905, 128). On occasion, when bank positions were challenged by 
other members of  boards of  directors, banks  resorted  to massive purchases 
of  company  stock  to  secure  controlling  interest  (Jeidels  1905,  111). Still 
later in  the firm’s life cycle, the influence of  its principal  banker typically 
waned, and other banks competed for its Underwriting business (Jeidels 1905, 
With respect to the quantity of bank holdings of claims on firms, table 8.4 
reports Eistert’s year-end estimates of the amount of direct overdraft financing 
of  industry (a component of  overdrafts, or Kontokorrentkredite, from which 
Eistert excludes overdraft lending for securities transactions and bankers ac- 
ceptances for financing trade). Table 8.4 also reports the amount of “perma- 
nent” participations of the banks (typically confined to bank shares in subsid- 
iary financial institutions: Whale  1930, 47-48,  150), banks’ other securities 
holdings (including underwriting inventories), and the amount of bankers ac- 
ceptances financing commerce. The table also displays each of these asset cate- 
gories as a fraction of total bank assets. While banks played an important role 
as holders of claims, just as important was their role in helping firms graduate 
(apparently rapidly) to find ultimate sources of funds outside the banking sys- 
tem. Thus, the banks used their special position as “delegated monitors” to 
“lever” their clients’ finances-allowing  their clients to reach a broad market 
for external finance by providing direct lending at early stages of projects, and 
later underwriting equity as a signal of their clients’ quality possibly and as a 
vehicle for sharing in capital gains (as argued in section 8.2’s discussion of 
time consistency). 
Jeidels (1905, 106) and Eistert (1970,  142) interpret the rising importance 
of Kontokorrentkredite after 1890 as evidence of increasing bank involvement 
in financing new industrial projects after the 1890s, which they see as signifi- 
cant evidence of the role of banks in priming the pumps of industrial finance 
during this crucial period of  German industrial growth. The bank acted as a 
monitor of the firm’s conduct, a source of discipline over management (through 
128-30). Table 8.4  Selected Assets of the German Credit Banks, Levels and Percentage of  Total Assets 
“Permanent” 
Industrial Credit  Acceptances  Participations  Other Securities 
(millions of marks)  %  (millions of marks)  %  (millions of marks)  %  (millions of marks)  % 
1888  329.1  12  448.3  16  32.4  I  338.4  12 
1893  4 16.5  12  63  I .5  18  67.9  2  351.9  10 
1898  902.1  14  984.4  15  183.4  3  728.0  11 
1903  1,334.2  15  1,301.2  15  236.1  3  956.5  11 
1907  2,336.6  18  1,890.7  15  439.4  3  1,289.6  10 
-  -  -  -  1913  2,930.3  18  2,450.6  15 
Sources: Industrial credit and acceptances derived from Eistert  1970, 92. Data for permanent participations and 
other securities are from National Monetary Commission  1910, table  15, except for total assets for  1913. Total 
assets for 1913 is taken from Deutsche Bundesbank 1976, 56. 
Notes; Some asset categories are omitted from this table, including cash assets, collaterlized loans, and lending for 
securities purchases. Industrial credit  is defined as Konrokorrenrkredite (overdraft account credit) for industrial 
purposes. Acceptances are bankers’ acceptances used primarily to finance goods in transit. Permanent participations 
are long-term securities holdings of banks, which are mainly stock held in other (essentially subsidiary) financial 
institutions. Other securities pertains to all other securities held, which mainly reflects ongoing underwriting activ- 
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directorates and voting of clients’ shares), and a source of advice on financial 
and business organization. 
Specific evidence from industry case studies on the role of German banks 
in  industrial finance is abundant. Jeidels (1905) and Riesser  (I 91  1) provide 
lengthy discussions of the evolution of the major German industries and the 
roles played by banks. For example, Riesser ( 191  1, 7 13-2  1) argues that assis- 
tance by informed bank lenders was crucial to the development of the electrical 
industry. He discusses the coevolution of firms and banks and describes how 
the role banks played changed with the industrial organization of the industry. 
Initially, banks promoted widespread entry by a multitude of firms, and fund- 
ing of  firms’ needs was accomplished through direct lending, followed later 
by placements of securities. As the industry developed, consolidation of firms 
raised the scale of financing needs, which in turn, increased the need for in- 
terbank cooperation through financing syndicates. Banks reinforced the trend 
toward  industrial  concentration  by  helping  to  coordinate  decision  making 
among firms. The history of the electrical industry illustrates how banks en- 
couraged technological  innovativeness at the crucial early stage of industrial 
development and made efficient large-scale operations feasible. The Germans 
developed a larger and more interregional electrical utility system than that of 
Britain or the United States during this period (Hughes 1983). Carlson (1991) 
argues that the greater fragmentation of the U.S.  electrical system reflected 
financing constraints. On the demand side, utility customers were financed by 
electrical manufacturers rather than  banks. According to Carlson, this ham- 
pered the ability of manufacturers to expand and integrate their operations, and 
led to a less standardized range of products in the United States. 
Links between industrial firms and banks were much weaker in the United 
States. This reflected in large part the small size of incorporated banks relative 
to the  large needs of  industrial  borrowers.  More  than  twenty-six  thousand 
banks were operating in  1914, and the overwhelming majority of these were 
not permitted to operate branches, even within their home state. Even the lim- 
ited operation of universal banking through securities affiliates did not begin 
in earnest until after World War I. The first three investment affiliates of na- 
tional banks were organized between 1908 and 1917, and served as models for 
the growth of affiliates in the 1920s (Peach 1941, 18-20,61-64). 
Much of  bank financing  of firms occurred without any direct (much less 
ongoing) relationship between the bank and the firms it financed. Intermediar- 
ies’ claims on firms primarily took the form of corporate bond holdings placed 
through syndicates. According to Goldsmith (1958, 222), for the period 1901- 
12, bonds held by all intermediaries accounted for 18  percent of funds supplied 
by external sources (that is, excluding retained earnings) to nonfinancial firms. 
Commercial banks accounted  for two-thirds  of  corporate bond  holdings by 
intermediaries in  1912.16 Based on flow-of-funds accounting, bank loans (for 
16. Goldsmith (1958, 335) gives total  intermediaries holdings of  bonds. He provides data on 
commercial banks’ bond holdings, decomposed according to type of  issuer (339-40). 287  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
all purposes) accounted for 12 percent of externally supplied funds for 1901- 
12. Using balance-sheet data of nonfinancial corporations for 1900 and 1912, 
Goldsmith, Lipsey, and Mendelson  (1963, 2: 146) calculate that bank  loans 
amounted to roughly  10 percent of  firms’ debts, and less than 5 percent of 
firms’ assets. Bonds and notes accounted for roughly half of firms’ debts, and 
trade debt made up 15 percent. The use of short-term bank lending to finance 
industrial operations, as distinct from commerce, cannot be quantified (see 
Goldsmith 1958, 344). 
Reliance on bank loans was relatively high for small firms. Large manufac- 
turing firms relied more on bond issues as a means of  indirect bank finance 
(Goldsmith 1958,217-18)  and less on loans from banks as a source of financ- 
ing, especially prior to the  1940s. Of  course, under a unit banking  system, 
large-scale firms operating throughout the country would have had to borrow 
from many small unit banks simultaneously. Bond market syndications facili- 
tated this transaction by providing a means for banks to share risk and coordi- 
nate capital allocations. The commercial paper market (a unique innovation of 
the American financial system) performed a similar role for short-term bor- 
rowing needs of large, high-quality borrowers. From humble beginnings in the 
187Os, the commercial  paper market reached  its pre-World  War  I1 peak in 
1920 at $1.3 billion, consisting of the debts of over four thousand borrowers 
(Selden 1963, 8). 
Dobrovolsky and Bernstein  (1960,  141-42)  report funding  sources for a 
sample of  fourteen large manufacturing firms from  1900 to  1910, based on 
accounting records of  sources of  net inflows of funds. For the period  1900- 
1910, these firms reported a total financial inflow of $1.2 billion, of  which 
$357 million came from external finance. Of this, only $29 million was in the 
form of short-term debt. Some bank loans during this period also took the form 
of long-term debt, but judging from Goldsmith (1958, 335, 339), long-term 
loans from commercial banks were uncommon around the turn of the century. 
While small firms relied more on banks, it does not follow that banks con- 
tributed  to the financing of  industrial  capital expansion  by  small firms any 
more than they did to that of large firms. Two detailed studies of the sources 
of capital in manufacturing provide a glimpse of the contribution of banks to 
industrial expansion in Illinois (Marquardt 1960) and California (Tmsk 1960) 
in the mid-  to late nineteenth century. In the case of California, thirty-three of 
seventy-one manufacturing firms studies over the period  1859-1 880 financed 
their investment entirely from internal sources. The others incorporated, took 
in partners, and supplemented these sources with earnings of existing partners 
from other  sources,  sale of  stock or real  estate,  “eastern capital” (in three 
cases), and loans from a private banker (the same banker in both instances). 
Clearly, commercial banks had no role in the expansion of manufacturing capi- 
tal in California prior to 1880. 
Illinois’s experience was similar, but the role of banks in financing industrial 
expansion may  have been greater. The rapid expansion of  manufacturing in 
Illinois began in the  1860s. From  1860 to  1870, manufacturing  production 288  Charles W.  Calomiris 
and capital each increased sevenfold, and employment increased sixfold. From 
1870 to 1880, manufacturing production doubled. Marquardt (1960) examined 
the personal and business histories of fifty entrepreneurs. She found that these 
firms were financed initially from accumulated savings of would-be manufac- 
turing entrepreneurs, or by entrepreneurs taking on a partner with savings. Sub- 
sequent funding typically was provided by retained earnings. Occasionally, this 
was supplemented by the sale of  entrepreneurial assets, the expansion of  the 
partnership, or incorporation. In twenty-six  out of  fifty cases, manufacturing 
entrepreneurs of relatively mature firms used profits to invest in an interest in 
a bank, which “marked the beginning of  more rapid success for them. They 
owned in part or had access to, funds, either large or small, which would enable 
them to grow and to progress.” This was especially  important in the  1860s 
because manufacturing was moving rapidly toward mechanization and oppor- 
tunities for expansion outpaced accumulated profits (507). In short, firms pro- 
gressed up the pecking order as they matured. Entrepreneurs secured access to 
external funds by investing in banks, on which they could rely for funds. While 
Marquardt’s study does indicate a role for banks in industrial finance, it says 
as much about the limits of that role as it does about banks’ potential impor- 
tance. Access to bank  funds was extremely  limited, and bank  stockholders 
were given preference as bank borrowers.  Such a system had worked well to 
provide the needs of business in New England in the antebellum period (La- 
moreaux  1994),  but by the 1870s, this system was insufficient. Restrictions on 
insider lending, combined with the rising scale of manufacturing and the lim- 
ited size of  unit banks, meant that access to a unit bank’s deposit base could 
not keep pace with the needs of  bank insiders. Thus, while banks may  have 
played a role in financing industrial expansion in Illinois and elsewhere, the 
importance of this role was limited to the “adolescent” stage of the firm’s life 
cycle-after  the firm had become mature enough to invest in becoming a bank 
insider, but before the firm had become too large to rely on a unit bank for its 
funding needs. Even this role of  banks in industrial finance is apparent only 
in the histories of  some firms (roughly half of  those chosen for case studies 
by Marquardt). 
To summarize, unlike German industrialists, American industrialists could 
not depend on a single banking relationship to guide them through their grow- 
ing and changing financial needs over the years. They relied less on banks for 
credit, especially to finance large-scale projects. At each stage in their financial 
life cycle, firms had to change their financial relationships as they moved to 
new financial instruments and new funding sources for their investments. The 
small size of banks limited bank lending to large-scale firms. Even relatively 
large banks in major cities considering lending to industrial firms would have 
foreseen  limited future relationships  with  borrowers,  making  some lending 
prohibitively expensive (Mayer 1988). Finally, given the reduced role of inter- 
mediaries in direct lending, bank  finance of  industry was limited mainly  to 
holding securities placed through  syndicates. The form of these financial in- 
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8.3.4  Financial Instruments and the Financial Structure of Industrial Firms 
Section 8.2 highlighted some important disadvantages of long-term debt fi- 
nancing compared to a combination of short-term debt and equity. Relative to 
short-term debt, long-term debt can be costly because of  incentive problems 
(the firm’s incentive to add risk increases in the absence of a rollover option). 
Relative to equity, all forms of debt increase the probability of financial distress 
by raising leverage. Finally, when a firm’s debt takes the form of dispersed debt 
holdings, rather than concentrated  lending from intermediaries, the costs of 
managing financial distress (coordinating workouts) is increased (see Riesser 
I9  1 1, 365-66,  on German banks’ roles in managing reorganizations). For all 
these reasons, long-term debt is a costly form of finance. If, however, firms are 
constrained to finance themselves through  syndication networks rather than 
through intermediaries, then  the transactions costs of rollover of  short-term 
debt can be prohibitive. And equity may not be a feasible alternative to debt, 
either because the costs of  resolving asymmetric information between firms 
and ultimate sources of funds are large (because the “lemons discount” for 
equity will be larger than that for debt, as in Myers and Majluf  1984), or be- 
cause the equity holder is unable to exert control over corporate management 
(Jensen and Meckling  1976). Baskin (1988) argues that asymmetric informa- 
tion explains the dearth of equity issues historically in the United States. Thus, 
despite its high costs, long-term debt may be the best means for firms to raise 
funds in the absence of  large-scale, universal banking. Of course, in light of 
incentive problems of issuing long-term debt, risky firms may be denied access 
to this market as well, leaving them to rely on retained earnings alone as a 
source of  finance.” 
According to this interpretation of long-term debt as a “last resort” in the 
absence of alternatives-albeit  one not available to all firms-one  would ex- 
pect the structure of German firms’ balance sheets to rely far less on long- 
term debt than do American firms. Table 8.5 confirms this prediction. Private 
domestic corporate bond issues are a much smaller fraction of total securities 
issues in Germany than in the United States over the pre-World  War I period, 
and represent a relatively small fraction of outstanding corporate claims. More- 
over, the German data on bond issues are for gross issues, while the U.S. data 
are for net issues;  thus, the difference  reported  in  table  8.5  in the  relative 
amount of stock and bond issues understates the true difference. In Germany, 
17. Indeed, access to bond markets has sometimes been very selective. Calomiris and Hubbard 
(1994) found that very few firms in their sample of  publicly traded firms in the mid-1930s had 
access to the bond market. Only a quarter of all firms issued bonds, and  10 percent of firms ac- 
counted for 90 percent of bond issues. Bond-issuing firms were three time as large as non-bond- 
issuing firms. Interestingly, while firms with higher measured costs of  finance had higher debt 
ratios, they were less likely to have outstanding debt in the form of bonds. These data lend support 
to the view that incentive problems of long-term debt may have limited its use. An alternative 
explanation  for  the  Calomiris-Hubbard  sample  would  argue  that  access  to  the  bond  market 
was substantially limited by regulatory change in  1935. Prior to the Banking Act of 1935, banks 
were allowed to sell low-grade bonds to their customers. After 1935, this was prohibited (Haven 
1940, 7). Table 8.5  Corporate Finance in Germany and the United States prior to 
World War I 
Balance-Sheet Data for Nonfinancial Corporations 
United States, 1900  United States, 1912  Germany, 1900  Germany, 1912 
(millions of $)  (millions of $)  (millions of marks)  (millions of  marks) 
Equity  19,960  33,108  19,210  31,157 
Total liability  15,038  33,246 
Trade debt  3,066  4,355 
Bank loans  1,420  3,780 
Mortgages  778  1.674 
Bonds and 
notes  7,072  18,096  1,883  3,560 
Securities Issues Data 
U.S. Manufacturing  German Nonfinancial 
and Mining  U.S. Industrials  Domestic Corporations 
Gross  Gross  Gross 
Net Bond  Net Stock  Bond Issues,  Stock Issues,  Gross Bond  Stock 
Issues  Issues  Annual  Annual  Issues  Issues 
(millions  (millions  Average  Average  (millions of  (millions of 





1900  37  128 
1901  557  256 
1902  151  141 
1903  252  119 
1904  74  103 
1905  122  118 
1906  113  165 
1907  125  168 
1908  107  136 
1909  I39  183 
1910  124  178 
1911  206  203 
1912  50  288 
1913  -  10  185 





















I10  150 
5,594 
324 


















Sources; Balance sheets of US.  nonfinancial corporations are from Goldsmith, Lipsey, and Mendel- 
son 1963,2:146. German data on equity and bonds are from Deutsche Bundesbank 1976,290, 294. 
The German data on bonds seem to be face values (which are essentially the same as market values). 291  The Costs of  Rejecting Universal Banking 
Table 8.5  (continued) 
To calculate the market value of  German equity, I combined the book-value estimate (290) with the 
market-to-book-value index for corporate stocks (294). For example, German equity hook-value in 
1900 was 10,384 million marks and the index was 1.85. Data on securities issues of US.  manufactur- 
ing and mining corporations are from Dobrovolsky and Bemstein 1960,333.  Data on securities issues 
of industrials are from Friend 1967.68. Data on German securities issues are from Eistert 1970, 105. 
firms made a relatively rapid transition from Kontokorrentkredite into the eq- 
uity market, and relied relatively little on bond finance. In the United States, 
industrial finance through outside equity was more limited. Indeed, as Carosso 
(1970, 81-82)  points out, for many industrial and retail establishments prior to 
World War  I, outside equity  issues were  not  a possibility. As Doyle (1991) 
points out in his detailed analysis of  sugar-refining and meat-packing indus- 
tries, equity issues of American firms during this period typically were associ- 
ated with “strategic” restructuring of the firm’s preexisting liabilities, and not 
with the financing of industrial expansion, 
8.3.5  The Financial Structure of Banks 
Sources of finance for banks also were very different in Germany and the 
United States, with German banks relying to a much greater extent on equity 
rather than deposits as a source of funds. Of course, unlike national banks, the 
German credit banks did not issue currency, so one might expect them to show 
larger equity ratios than  American banks for this reason. But this does not 
explain the difference. State-chartered banks in the United States lacked note- 
issuing authority, but had similar capital ratios to national banks. As table 8.6 
shows,  the  difference  between  German  banks’  and  U.S.  national  banks’ 
capital-to-asset ratios is larger than can be explained by the presence of notes 
on national bank balance sheets. 
The high German capital ratios are especially puzzling when one considers 
the large size of  German banks compared to U.S. banks.  Within the United 
States, larger banks tended to have lower capital ratios than small banks. For 
example, Calomiris (1993) shows that branching banks in California had half 
the capital ratios  of  other U.S. banks. Similarly, adjusting for differences in 
portfolio risk, large nationwide (nonuniversal) commercial banks in Canada 
had  lower capital ratios than their American counterparts. Calomiris (1992) 
argues that lower capital ratios for large commercial banks reflected risk reduc- 
tions brought about by  large size. As banks became large, they were able to 
satisfy  depositors’  concerns  about  risk  with  smaller  capital  ratios.  Banks 
wanted to conserve on capital because it was a relatively  expensive form of 
finance. The limitation on banks’ access to capital is illustrated by the fact that 
the demand for bank stock was confined mainly to investors located near the 
bank. A study by  the Comptroller of the Currency of stock ownership in na- 
tional banks in  1897 revealed that the largest out-of-state holdings were for the 292  Charles W. Calomiris 
Table 8.6  Sources of Bank Financing, Germany and the United States, 1904 
German Credit Banks 
(millions of  marks) 
U.S. National Banks 
(millions of  $) 
Net worth (book)  2,873 
Liabilities  6,5  I8 
Deposit accounts  1,897 
Credit accounts  3,301 
Acceptances  1,320 
Net worthhabilities  0.44 





Sources: National bank balance-sheet data are derived from state-level data reported in Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1959. National banknotes are from Board of Governors 
of  the Federal Reserve System 1976, 408. German data are from National Monetary Commission 
1910, table 15. 
western and Pacific regions, which had out-of-state holdings of less than  12 
percent  (Breckenridge  1899, 10). Thus a possible explanation  of the higher 
capital ratios of German universal banks could be the higher demand for bank 
stock by “outsiders.” 
What would explain higher demand by outsiders for universal banks’ stock? 
First, given the potential for German nonfinancial firms to issue large amounts 
of equity, “thick-market’’ externalities may have favored similar financing by 
banks. Second, if German banks were better able to communicate information 
about their portfolio risks to their stockholders, then lemons discounts would 
be mitigated, allowing them to reap the advantages of equity finance. Thus, the 
efficiency of capital markets in Germany due to universal banking may have 
helped finance banks, too. Third, the confidence of outsiders in bank stock may 
have been enhanced by a reputational effect. If outsiders were aware that banks 
had  long-term  reputational  capital  worth  preserving,  then  they  should have 
been less concerned about short-term cheating by banks. Thus, the disciplinary 
role of demandable debt (stressed by Calomiris and Kahn 1991,  and Calomiris, 
Kahn, and Krasa  1992) would be less relevant for German banks. From this 
perspective, German banks may have been  able to  finance themselves more 
through outside equity than American banks because of long-run benefits they 
could expect to realize through their relationships with firms. These long-run 
benefits increased  the reputational  consequences of  cheating  and helped to 
support the credibility of bankers. 
It may  never be possible  to distinguish  among these explanations  for the 
higher equity ratios of German banks. But this decomposition is relatively un- 
important. The important  common feature of  all these explanations  is their 
dependence on universal banking as a precondition to permitting banks to rely 
on outside equity as an important source of finance. 293  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
8.3.6  Investment Banking Spread as a Measure of Financing Efficiency 
An important dimension of cost savings stressed in section 8.2’s discussion 
of  the benefits of  universal  banking is the reduction in the cost to firms of 
underwriting and distributing securities. The investment banker’s “spread”  is 
defined as the difference between the market value of securities issued and the 
value received for these issues by the issuing firm. Data on spreads are useful 
for three purposes. First, average issue costs provide an overall comparison of 
the costs of issuing securities in the United States and Germany. Second, varia- 
tion in spreads across securities and firms of different types can be used to 
gauge cross-country differences in the relative costs of issuing particular kinds 
of  securities. For example, one would expect equity issues to be especially 
costly in the United States relative to Germany because of the greater costs of 
placing junior securities in a nonuniversal banking system, Finally, firm-level 
data on the factors that raise or lower costs of securities issues offer evidence 
on the sources of the costs of issuing bonds and stocks. For example, one can 
examine whether bankers’ spreads primarily reflect information costs, physical 
transactions costs, taxes, or economic rents of the investment banker. 
American investment bankers have guarded the details of their financial ar- 
rangements carefully, and data on investment bankers’ spreads are notoriously 
hard to come by. For the United States, detailed data are known only for a few 
cases prior to the 1920s, and only after 1936 are data available for the whole 
population of securities issuers. For Germany, I have been able to locate some 
data on individual spreads for the pre-World  War I period from Saling S  Borsen 
Jahrbuch (the German equivalent of Moody S  Industrial Manual). For many 
firms (roughly half), Saling S  reports details of the underwriting costs of equity 
issues and/or the total amount of funds received by firms through equity issues. 
A minor problem with the data is that it is not always clear whether reported 
numbers include fees other than bankers’ commissions. Equity issues entailed 
local  and national taxes,  as well as physical  costs (printing, etc.). From ex- 
amples where the breakdown of such costs are known, the total costs of taxes 
and physical expenses seem in the range of  2-3  percent. For example, Har- 
pener  Bergbau  A. G., a large Dortmund  mining company, issued 9 million 
marks of stock in 1909. The spread was 436,000 marks, or 4.84 percent of the 
issue. Of this cost, 176,000 marks (40 percent of the total cost) reflected the 
national government tax on equity issues.’R  Thus, in the absence of the govern- 
ment’s securities tax, the bankers’ spread would have been 2.9 percent. While 
reported data on commissions may overstate true commissions (because bank- 
ers sometimes paid these fees for firms), and reported data on total costs may 
understate total costs (because measured costs may not always include federal 
or local taxes), errors from these sources cannot be large, and data from firms 
that reported  both  measures  indicate that reported  total  costs  generally  in- 
18. I thank Richard Tilly for providing this example 294  Charles W.  Calomiris 
Table 8.7  Bankers’ Commissions (Spreads) and Total Issuing Costs for German 
Common Stock Issues, 1893-1913 (a) 
25th  75th  25th  75th 
Mean Bank  Percentile  Percentile  Mean Total  Percentile  Percentile 
Spread  Bank Spread  Bank Spread  Cost  Total Cost  Total Cost 
All Issues 
Electrical  3.67  2.57  4.55  5.08  3.61  7.00 
12  # firms  13 
# observations  21  -  -  -  -  20 
Manufacturing  3.90  2.94  4.35  5.30  2.78  7.60 
15  # firms  19 
-  20  # observations  30  -  ~ 
Issues Less Than 1 Million 
Electrical  3.94  3.49  4.26  5.24  4.00  6.72 
3  # firms  4 
# observations  7  -  -  -  -  3 
Manufacturing  3.45  2.78  3.86  5.29  3.33  6.92 
10  # firms  10 
-  15  # observations  18  - 
Firms with 1913 Capital Less Than 2 Million 
Manufacturing  4.11  3.57  4.80  5.93  3.33  8.80 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
- 
-  -  -  - 
-  -  -  - 
-  - 
-  -  -  -  5 
5 
# firms  3 
# observations  6  -  -  -  - 
Source: Sulingk Borsen Juhrbuch 1913. 
Notes: Percentages of bankers’ commissions (spreads) is the difference between the amount paid for an 
issue by purchasers and the amount paid by  the bankers to the issuing firm divided by  the total amount 
paid for the issue. Percentage of total costs is the net funds raised by the firm (net of all expenses, including 
taxes, printing costs, and commissions) divided by the amount paid for the issue. Data are for firms that 
reported such information in  Saling k  Borsen Juhrbuch in  the electrical industry (electrical equipment 
producers and power plant operators) and the metal manufacturers industry. The sample includes all re- 
porting firms in the electrical industry and all reporting firms whose names begin with A through K for 
the metals manufacturing industry. 
cluded all costs and that reported commissions generally did not include fees 
other than commissions. 
Data on commissions for common  stock issues earned by  German banks 
from  1893 to 1913 are provided in table 8.7. The sample of firms for which 
data were collected include all reporting firms in the electrical industry (which 
includes manufacturers of  electrical equipment and operating power plants) 
and firms in the metal  manufacturing industry whose names begin  with the 
letters A through  K. Both of  these industries are important producers of new 
products, and both are central to the second industrial revolution. The metal 
manufacturing industry includes many small firms, while the electrical indus- 
try is dominated by  large firms, so together these two industries can provide 
some evidence on the role of firm size and issue size in determining bankers’ 
commissions. For both  industries, I divide  the  sample into small  and  large 
issues (less than or greater than  1 million marks, which equals $220,000). For 295  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
metals, I also report data for firms with small total capital in 1913 (less than 2 
million marks). The difference between average spreads and average total costs 
is 1.4  1 percent for the electrical industry and 1.40 percent for metal manufac- 
turing, which suggests that taxes and physical costs were generally included in 
total costs and not in commissions. Bankers’ commissions averaged 3.67 per- 
cent for the electrical industry and 3.90 percent for metal manufacturing. Com- 
missions on small and large issues are essentially the same. Although small 
metals issues show lower average costs, the difference is not statistically sig- 
nificant for this small sample. Metals firms with low total capital had average 
commissions of 4.11 percent, compared to 3.90 percent for the industry as a 
whole. Again, this difference is small and not statistically significant. Overall, 
these data support the view that commissions on common stock were roughly 
3-5  percent, and that they did not vary much by  industry, firm size, or size 
of issue. 
For the United States, firm-level data on bankers’ commissions are not gen- 
erally available for the pre-World  War I period. Indeed, the dearth of  equity 
issues in the United States historically made it difficult for the Securities and 
Exchange Commission to locate data on common stock spreads prior to 1936. 
Even with respect to bonds and preferred stock, the SEC’s retrospective study 
begins only in the 1920s. Despite this problem, it is possible to gauge roughly 
the range of commission charges during the pre-World  War I period using data 
from the later period and a few observations on individual transactions from 
the pre-World  War I period. Data on bankers’ spreads for bonds and preferred 
stocks during the  1920s and common stock spreads for the 1930s reported in 
table 8.8 are a reasonable, and possibly a conservative, measure of their pre- 
World War  I values. There is little evidence of  change in preferred stock or 
bond spreads from the  1920s to the mid-l930s, so there is little reason to be- 
lieve that spreads were influenced by the Glass-Steagall separation of commer- 
cial and investment banking.I9 As argued above, the fundamental restrictions 
on universal  banking were regulations that fragmented the banking  system, 
and these were in place long before Glass-Steagall. Moreover, there is some 
discussion of  spreads for the pre-World  War I period that confirms this view. 
Brandeis (1914, 94-99)  discusses bankers’ spreads at length in his attack on 
the money trust. He notes that Morgan’s spread exceeded 20 percent for the 
organization of  U.S.  Steel, and was 25 percent  for underwriting  the “Tube 
Trust.” More generally, Brandeis writes: “Nor were monster commissions lim- 
ited to trust promotions. More recently, bankers’ syndicates have, in many in- 
stances, received for floating preferred stocks of recapitalized industrial con- 
cerns, one-third of all common  stock issued, besides a considerable  sum in 
cash. And for the sale of  preferred stock of  well established manufacturing 
19. Calomiris and Raff (1993) report data on common stock spreads from the Lehman Brothers 
deal books and argue, based on these data, that common stock spreads were essentially the same 
in the 1920s and 1930s. 296  Charles W.  Calomiris 
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Table 8.8  Bankers’ Spreads in the United States before World War I1 
1925-29 
(% of issue)  1930s (% of issue) 
Common  Preferred  Bonds  Common  Preferred  Bonds 




# of issues 




# of issues 
All to public, IBs“ 
Total cost, underwritten issues 
# of issues 
Total cost, best effortsb 
# of issues 
(1935-38)  (1935-38) 
NA  8  6  18  10 
NA  7  5  16  9 
NA  1  1  2  I 
NA  96  423  24  1  206 
(1938)  (1938) 
22  12 
20  11 
2  1 
68  37 
(1938)  (1938) 
23  4 
16  9 
21  14 
















Source; Securities and Exchange Comimssion 1940, 1941. 
“All issues of securities to the public transacted through investment bankers. 
bBest-effort issues are placed by investment bankers without price guarantees. 
concerns, cash commissions (or profits) of from 7 1/2 to 10 percent of the cash 
raised are often exacted. On bonds of high-class industrial concerns, bankers’ 
commissions (or profits)  of  from 5 to  10 points have been common”  (95). 
These figures are similar to the numbers for the 1920s and mid-1930s reported 
in table 8.8. 
Interestingly, the spreads for common stock far exceed those for preferred 
stock, which in turn far exceed those for bonds. This is what one would expect 
if the spreads largely represent compensation for information costs incurred in 
arranging the issues. The underwriting  (insurance) aspect of the investment 
bankers’  services do not explain the differences in the spreads for different 
types of  securities. In fact, best-effort  flotations, on which there is no under- 
writing risk, show larger commissions on average than underwritten flotations. 
This typically is explained by the fact that best-effort flotations involve riskier 
firms (Friend 1967, 39) and therefore entail greater due diligence and market- 
ing costs. 
It is worth emphasizing how large these spreads are. A 20 percent  spread 
indicates that a firm only receives 80 cents for every dollar of claims it issues. 
This places a substantial cost on investments, especially by young, unseasoned 
firms. An investment opportunity must be able to generate enough income to 
pay  interest or dividends to claimants and compensate existing  shareholders 
by  an amount (in present value) in excess of  20 percent of  the project’s cost. 297  The Costs of  Rejecting Universal Banking 
There is corroborating evidence that external finance costs placed wedges of 
this magnitude between the social and private benefits of pursuing investment 
projects. Calomiris and Hubbard (1994) find that in the mid- 1930s roughly a 
quarter of publicly traded firms in the United  States had a cost differential 
between  internally  and externally  generated  funds in excess of  20 percent. 
They used a firm’s dividend-payout reaction to the undistributed profits tax of 
1936-37  to measure this shadow price differential. In a study of  nineteenth- 
century profits, Atack and Bateman (1992) find large and widening differences 
in profit rates between small and large manufacturing firms in the United States 
of a similar order of magnitude, which suggest bamers to entry and geographic 
immobility of capital for financing small and medium-sized firms in manufac- 
turing.20 
The data reported in tables 8.7 and 8.8 indicate a substantially lower average 
cost of  bringing equities to market in Germany, which helps to explain the 
relative dearth of equity issues in the United States shown in table 8.5. German 
bankers’  spreads  on equity  were  less  than  one-fourth those  in the  United 
States. Small German firms were able to  issue equity for less than the cost 
large American corporations paid for issuing bonds. Interestingly, in Germany, 
spreads did not vary by size as they did in the United States. This is consistent 
with viewing universal banking networks (which permit internal marketing of 
new issues) as economizing on fixed costs of marketing stock issues. 
One possible explanation for this difference is that German banks earned 
large anticipated capital gains on underwritings in addition to spreads. While 
a detailed examination of this proposition must await further research on firm- 
level data, an analysis of  aggregate data suggests capital gains were small. 
Riesser (1911,466) cites data on income earned from the sum of commissions 
and capital gains on securities transactions in 1903 published in the Kolnische 
Zeitung (see also Whale 1930, 26). A rough measure of capital gains earned 
by banks on securities holdings can be derived by combining this estimate with 
Eistert’s (1970) estimates of total securities issued to derive a measure of total 
income from spreads and capital gains as a ratio of total issues. These data are 
reported in table 8.9. Using additional data on the composition of securities 
issues from Eistert (1970, 103), and the estimates of bankers’ commissions, 
one can place some bounds on the rate of capital gains. To do so requires an 
assumption  about  banks’  relative  earnings  from  underwriting  government 
bonds, corporate bonds, and equity. I assume that the banks’ earnings from 
commissions and  capital  gains  on  equities  are double those  for  corporate 
bonds, and that earnings on government bonds are 1 percent. Under these as- 
20. Average manufacturing profit rates of firms rose form 18 percent in 1850 to 34 percent in 
1880, while profit rates weighted by  capital fell from 16 percent to  15 percent. In the South in 
1880, unweighted profit rates were 43 percent, compared to 30 percent in the North. Clearly, for 
large numbers of  small and medium-sized firms, profit rates did not converge over time within or 
across regions during this period. Differences of 20 or 30 percent in profit rates across firms were 
common throughout the period 1850-80. 298  Charles W.  Calomiris 
Table 8.9  Estimate of German Banks’ Capital Gains Rate from Securities 
Underwritten in 1903 
Gross profits from commissions and capital gains 
Total securities placed 
Average spread 
55.7 million marks 
I .285.1 million marks 
0.043 
German government bonds placed  343.3 million marks 
Bonds placed (excluding German government)  597. I million marks 






Assumed ratio of profit rates from stocks and corporate bonds 
Assumed profit rate for government bonds 
Implied average profit rate for corporate bonds 
Implied average profit rate for stocks 
Implied capital gain rate for stocks given 4.0% commission 
Sources: Securities placed are from Eistert  1970, 103. Gross profits are from Kb’lnische Zeitung, 
as cited in Riesser 191  1, 466. 
sumptions, the total income earned from commissions plus capital gains on 
equity issues in 1903 was 8 percent of the amount issued. Given the estimate 
of 4 percent for equity commissions, this implies a 4 percent capital gain on 
equity issues. Thus, it seems that one cannot explain the difference between 
U.S. and German commissions on equity by appeal to offsetting capital gains 
by German underwriters. 
The U.S.-German underwriting-spread comparison illustrates more than the 
high cost of capital in the United States. It also indicates that rent extraction is 
an unlikely explanation of high underwriting costs in the United States. Ger- 
man banking was at least as concentrated and powerful an industry as the pur- 
ported money trust of  the United States. Yet  their spreads were quite small. 
Thus, higher average US. spreads likely reflected higher underlying costs of 
bringing issues to market in the United States. The fact that spreads for small 
firms and small issues in Germany were the  same as for large firms is also 
significant.  In the  United  States,  smaller firms  suffered  significantly  larger 
spreads, as shown in table 8.10, and firm size has also proven important in 
cross-sectional regression  analysis of  spreads  (Mendelson  1967). Thus, the 
lower cost of  equity issues in Germany relative to the United States affected 
the financing cost of  small firms even more than  shown by comparisons of 
average commissions. This lends credence to the view that “time-consistency” 
advantages and lower information costs (which are most relevant  for small, 
growing firms) are an important part of the explanation for why German com- 
missions were lower. 
Additional evidence from time-series and cross-sectional analysis of bank- 
ers’ spreads in the United States also suggests that spreads were more a func- 
tion of information cost than of rent. First, the fact that spreads were larger for 
preferred stock than for bonds, and largest for common  stock, is consistent 
with the information-cost interpretation  of the spreads, and not with the rent- 
extraction interpretation. As Miller (1967, 157) shows, concentration in Amer- 299  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
Table 8.10  Costs of Flotation of Primary Common Stock Issues Offered through 










Size of  Issue 
Issue < $5 million 
Issue <  $5 million 
Issue <  $5 million 
Issue <  $5 million 
Issue >  $5 million 
Issue >  $5 million 
Issue >  $5 million 
Issue >  $5 million 
~ 
Number of Issues  Average Cost as % Proceeds 
















Sources: Securities and Exchange Commission 1940, 1941, 1970. 
ican investment banking has always been highest in bond underwriting, yet 
bonds have always enjoyed the lowest spreads. Second, as table 8.10 shows, 
common  stock spreads fell most dramatically  from the  1930s to the early 
1960s, but this was not associated with increased competition. Miller (1967, 
163) finds that the only reduction in concentration of investment banking over 
this period occurred in the bond  market,  in which spreads fell least. Third, 
cross-sectional studies of  stock and bond  spreads (Cohan  1961; Mendelson 
1967) find substantial evidence linking variation  in  spreads to “quality”  or 
information-related variables. For example, bond spreads increase with bond 
yields.  Stock spreads are higher for issues that include “extra inducements,” 
and for issues with lower-quality underwriters, which Miller (1967) and Men- 
delson (1967,445,474) associate with lower-quality firms. The most plausible 
explanation for the technological change that lowered  spreads over time was 
the increase in bulk sales to institutional investors, which reduced the signaling 
and marketing costs of appealing to a widely dispersed group of investors (Ha- 
ven  1940; Mendelson 1967,413-19).  The rise of direct placements after World 
War  I1 also provided an alternative to syndication. These innovations were a 
partial substitute for a universal banking system, in which the universal bank 
would have directly linked issuers and holders. 
8.3.7  Financial Returns and Access to Securities Markets 
Arguments about the effects of higher information and control costs in in- 
dustrial finance  in the  United  States relative  to Germany do not have clear 
empirical implications for expected returns on financial instruments. On the 
one hand, if universal banking in Germany were superior as a mechanism for 
limiting ex ante lemons discounts on securities, for disciplining firms, and for 
managing corporate distress in default states, then more high-risk firms would 
be admitted to securities markets, and more financial claims would be held in 
the form of riskier junior instruments like stocks. On the other hand, if banks 
are very good at reducing lemons problems, disciplining firms, and organizing 300  Charles W.  Calomiris 
workouts,  then  to the extent  that these risks are systematic, overall risk  on 
traded assets could be lower for Germany.*’  Thus, depending on which of these 
two effects dominates,  returns on financial assets could be  higher  or lower 
under universal banking. 
Comparisons of interest rate and yield “spreads”-returns  in excess of the 
riskless  interest-rate  benchmark  within  each  country-provide  more  infor- 
mation than comparisons of nominal returns across countries. There are prob- 
lems  in making inferences  from comparisons  of returns on financial  assets 
across countries. Imperfect international capital market integration for riskless 
assets, and different expectations of commodity price movements across coun- 
tries make direct comparison of nominal yields and returns problematic meas- 
ures  of  the banking  system’s effect on real  costs of industrial  finance. The 
spreads between riskless  public bonds and private  securities returns in both 
countries remove elements of difference attributable to the relative supply of 
savings. 
A problem in relating differences in returns spreads to structural differences 
across countries is the need to infer average ex ante returns on equity from 
average ex post returns. Under the assumption that expected and actual returns 
were roughly  equal on average, ex post returns can serve as a gauge of ex- 
pected  stock returns. The shorter the  sample period, the more dubious this 
assumption becomes. Furthermore, it is not clear whether, under a specie stan- 
dard, nominal or real stock returns provide a better measure of  expected re- 
turns. If commodity prices under a specie standard follow a random walk (pos- 
sibly  with  long-run  mean  reversion,  as  suggested  by  Klein  1975, Rockoff 
1984, and Barsky 1987), nominal averages of returns may provide a superior 
measure of expected real returns. For this reason, and because of the availabil- 
ity of such data, I report nominal spreads. 
Table 8.11 reports data on spreads between government bond yields and pri- 
vate securities returns (bond yields and  stock returns) for Germany and the 
21. According to the capital asset pricing model, the average return on the market portfolio will 
compensate for systematic (nondiversifiable) risk. If the absence of universal banking increases 
overall systematic risk for stocks, then it should increase expected stock returns, ceteris parihus. 
Increased systematic risk could result, in theory, from at least three causes. First, under asymmetric 
information, the stock value of firms subject to borrowing constraints will vary with the shadow 
cost of external finance, which in turn will increase in times of low cash flow (Myers and Majluf 
1984; Gale and Hellwig 1985; Brock and LeBaron 1990). Since firms’ cash flows are correlated 
over the business cycle, this will induce greater correlation in stock returns among firms in  an 
economy without universal banking. Second, expected costs of financial distress also increase firm 
risk. Again, the probability of financial distress vanes systematically for all firms over the business 
cycle. If universal banking reduces distress costs, then it will decrease systematic risk in the port- 
folio of stocks. Third, managerial discipline may be more important during certain phases of the 
business cycle, since managers’ incentives to cheat vary with the state of  the economy. For ex- 
ample, under limited liability, managers who hold stock in their firm may chose to take on exces- 
sive risk in bad times (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Myers 1977; Calomiris and Kahn  1991). As in 
the other examples, this will induce greater systematic risk for the stock portfolio. 301  The Costs of  Rejecting Universal Banking 
Table 8.11  Yields and Spreads on Financial Portfolios, Germany and the United States 
(4)  (6)  (7) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  Private-Public  (5)  Private  Portfolio 
Government  Corporate  Stock  Bond Spread  Stock Spread  Portfolio  Spread 
Bond Yield  Bond Yield  Return  (2)-(I)  (3)-(1)  Returns  (6)-(1) 
Germany 
United States 
1883-1912  3.29  3.65  8.30  0.36  5.01  7.84  4.55 
1880-99  2.68  4.65  5.39  1.97  3.24  5.02  2.52 
1900-1913  2.32  5.00  6.80  2.68  4.48  5.90  3.57 
Sources: Data on stock returns is derived from Snowden 1990, 414-15.  U.S. corporate bond yields for 
1880-99  are Macaulay’s (1938)  unadjusted railroad series, as reported in US.  Department of Commerce 
1975, 1003. Hickman’s (1958, 81) data on bond yields for 1900-1909  are used for the later period. U.S. 
government bond yields are from Homer and Sylla 1991,3  16,343. Geman bond yields and nominal stock 
returns are from Tilly 1992, 103. German government bond yields are taken from Homer and Sylla 1991, 
Notes: For the United States, equal weights are given to stock and bond holdings in the portfolio, consis- 
tent with the evidence in table 8.5. In comparing realized returns on portfolios with yields, it is assumed 
that ex post stock returns on average were close to ex ante returns, which cannot be measured. 
260-6  I, 504. 
United States in two forms: simple spreads between government bonds and 
private stocks and bonds, and weighted spreads (using the proportion of stocks 
and bonds as weights) between private securities and government bonds. The 
weighted spread is useful as a measure of the total return on corporate assets 
(to control for differences in bond or stock spreads resulting from different 
corporate leverage in the United States and Germany). 
These data come from a variety of sources. U.S. stock returns for a market 
basket of  stocks are reported in  Snowden 1990, 387. Bond yields for U.S. 
government bonds are from Homer and Sylla 1991, 316, 343. Private bond 
yields prior to  1900 are the unadjusted railroad bond series from Macaulay 
1938. For the period after 1900, by which time other corporate bonds had be- 
come important in capital markets, I use Hickman’s (1958, 8  1) data on average 
ex  ante corporate bond yields for 1900-1909  as the measure of private bond 
yields.**  For German portfolio returns, I use Tilly’s (1992, 103) data on indus- 
trial bond yields and returns on industrial stocks. German government bond 
yields are taken from Homer and Sylla 1991, 260-61,  504. 
The differences between American and German returns spreads in table 8.11 
suggest larger financial portfolio risk associated with German financial assets, 
which mainly reflects the larger share of  equity in German finance, but also 
22. During this period, government bonds had a “circulation privilege,” meaning that they could 
be used as backing for national banknotes issued by national banks. Some researchers have avoided 
using these bond  yields as measures of nominal riskless returns because of a possible liquidity 
premium making their yields artificially low. Calomiris (1988, 726 n. 9) argues against this view 
on theoretical grounds, and Snowden (1990,388 n.  10) argues against it on empirical grounds. 302  Charles W.  Calomiris 
the higher returns on equity in Germany. As noted at the outset, such a finding 
may indicate information-cost advantages that brought higher-risk firms into 
the market for traded  securities under universal  banking. The facts that the 
government-corporate bond yield spread is larger in the United States and that 
the stock and portfolio spreads are larger in Germany are consistent with Ger- 
man firms achieving rapid access to equity markets. By themselves, however, 
the data on spreads do not prove universal banking was advantageous, since an 
alternative  interpretation of  high stock returns in  Germany is higher econo- 
mywide risk in  Germany. One way  to sort out whether high financial asset 
returns reflected well on Germany’s financial system is to compare traded port- 
folio risks and underlying total economic risks in the United States and Ger- 
many. If universal banking allowed riskier securities to enter financial markets 
(the sanguine view of universal banking), then risk differences in traded assets 
between the two countries should exceed underlying economic risk differences 
for all assets. 
One measure of economywide asset risk is the rate of business failure. Using 
the Black-Scholes model of  option pricing, bankruptcy risk is a function of 
underlying asset risk (sigma) and the ratio of debt to the value of assets. Hold- 
ing the debt-to-asset ratio constant, a higher risk  of  bankruptcy  indicates a 
higher asset risk. In fact, debt-to-asset ratios were similar in the two countries 
overall, despite the higher equity-to-debt ratio in German traded securities. In 
the United States, debt was 30 percent of total assets in 1990 (Goldsmith 1985, 
324-25),  while in Germany debt was 32 percent in  1913.23  Thus failure-rate 
differences are a good proxy for differences in asset risk between the two econ- 
omies. Table 8.12 reports data on liabilities of failed businesses in dollars and 
marks for 1900-1908 (the years for which I was able to locate German data on 
liabilities of  failed businesses),  and the ratio of  the  average annual level of 
these to national assets in 1912/13. Because Dun and Bradstreet’s data on lia- 
bilities of U.S. commercial and industrial failures exclude railroads and banks, 
I have added estimates of those numbers from other sources. This comparison 
of liabilities of failures relative to national assets gives some sense of the rela- 
tive magnitude of overall risk in the two economies. The all-inclusive ratio for 
Germany is slightly lower than that of the United States, and when bank fail- 
ures are omitted from the U.S. series, the two ratios are identical. This lends 
support to the view that universal banking lowered the threshold for admission 
into securities markets,  and stock markets  in particular.  The risk on traded 
assets in Germany was much higher than in the United States, even though the 
underlying economywide risk was essentially the same in the two economies. 
This is consistent with the proposition that lower information and control costs 
under  universal  banking  allowed  greater participation  of  high-risk  firms in 
securities markets. 
23. The German debt-to-asset ratio is calculated using definitions from Goldsmith’s US.  calcu- 
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Table 8.12  Risk of Failure in Germany and the United States 
(liabilities of failureshational assets) 
~~  ~ 
Liabilities of Failed Businesses 
United States 
(millions of $) 
Germany 
(millions of marks)  Dun and Bradstrcet  Railroads  Banks (assets) 
1900  188 
1901  224 
1902  392 
1903  319 
1904  398 
1905  499 
1906  346 
1907  302 
I908  311 












0  19 
27  15 
13  8 
0  9 
7  32 
31  21 
15  9 
74  208 
27  18 
194  339 (275 = liabilities) 
National Assets 
1912 
1913  639,300 
301,500 
Average Liabilities of Failures, 1900-08/National  Assets, 1912 or 1913 
0.00052  0.00065 
0.00055 (omitting bank failures) 
Sources: Dun and Bradstreet’s series on liabilities of failed businesses (US.  Department of Commerce 
1975,912)  for the United States excludes railroads and banks. Railroad bonds in default (Hickman 1960, 
250) is a lower bound of omitted railroad liabilities. Bremer (1935, 27) reports assets of all failed banks. 
Calomiris (1993, table 4) reports  the liability-to-asset ratio  of  all US. banks  in  1904 (0.81), which is 
assumed to hold for failed banks for 1900-08.  German liabilities of all failed firms is reported  in Vierrel 
Juhreshefe zur Sratisrik des deurschen Reichrs, sec. 4, various issues. Goldsmith (1985, 226, 301) pro- 
vides data on national assets for both countries. 
8.3.8  Summary 
Germany and the United States both achieved substantial industrial growth 
from 1870 to 1913. Comparisons of financial system performance suggest that 
German industrial growth was helped, and American growth was hindered, by 
their respective financial systems. Relatively high German ratios of financial 
assets and physical capital to GNP, and the high proportion of equipment in 
the German capital stock, are at least partly explained by lower costs of finance 
for industrial firms. These lower costs of finance are reflected in greater access 
to equity markets in Germany for risky industrial firms and their bankers, and 
lower costs of bringing securities to market. The low cost of floating equity 
issues in Germany, particularly for small firms, is especially revealing. Overall, 
the statistical comparison of German and American financial systems confirms 304  Charles W.  Calomiris 
qualitative historical and theoretical analysis that has linked universal banking 
to low costs of industrial finance. Unfortunately, much of the analysis that has 
been undertaken here has been restricted to aggregate comparisons. Compara- 
tive industry- and firm-level studies of finance costs are the obvious next step, 
and an important step before reaching definitive conclusions about the size of 
the contribution of German superiority in industrial finance to industrial per- 
formance. 
8.3.9  The Inverted Histories of German and American Industrial Finance 
Perhaps surprisingly, the United States enjoyed a universal banking system 
of a sort long before universal banking was established in Germany. As Davis 
(1957, 1960) and Lamoreaux (1991b) emphasize, New England’s antebellum 
banks were a primary source of  funding for New England industrialists. Just 
as in Germany, the links between industry and banking were very close. The 
banks were chartered to provide credit to their industrialist founders. In many 
cases, the officers and directors of  the banks were their principal borrowers. 
New England bank stock was widely held by  outsiders, and banks had much 
higher ratios of equity to assets than banks in other regions. In the mid-l850s, 
Massachusetts banks’ capital and surplus relative to assets was roughly double 
that of  New York and Pennsylvania (Calomiris,  1991a, 198).24  As Calomiris 
and Kahn ( 1990) show, stock returns were relatively low in New England com- 
pared to other regions. New England banks may have been able to attract large 
numbers of  outside stockholders and pay lower returns on equity than other 
banks  because  their  institutional  arrangements  mitigated  information  prob- 
lems. Each bank’s borrower-insiders had incentives to monitor each other, and 
interbank relationships ensured  monitoring  among  members of  the  Suffolk 
system (the New England payments clearing system run by Boston banks) and 
among commercial banks and savings banks (which financed much of  com- 
mercial banks’ activities).25 
Lamoreaux (1991b, 1994) documents the demise of this system. By  1900, 
New England’s banks had identical capital ratios to other regions’ banks (Ca- 
lomiris 199  la) and had changed toward financing more commercial undertak- 
ings and toward lending to bank outsiders. Calomiris  (1 993) interprets these 
changes as reflecting the growing mismatch between ever-larger scaled firms, 
and inherently small unit banks. As firms became larger, small banks found it 
24. In Calomiris 199 la, I argued that Boston and Providence banks were mainly responsible for 
the difference in capital ratios between New England and other states. While it is true that Provi- 
dence had unusually high capital ratios, even for New England, I overstated the difference between 
city and country banks in New England. My claim that “the capital of Massachusetts banks falls 
from 51 percent to 33 percent” (199) when one removes Boston banks from the sample was based 
on a calculation error. In fact, city and country banks in Massachusetts had nearly identical capi- 
tal ratios. 
25. It  is interesting to note the  many  similarities to the German system, including the close 
relationships between banks and firms, and the use of  savings institutions as investors in industrial 
banks. Savings cooperatives (kreditgenossenschaen) were large depositors in the German credit 
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increasingly difficult to satisfy the investment-financing  needs of customers, 
given the desirability of maintaining a diversified loan portfolio.  As Lamo- 
reaux  (1991a)  shows, many  New  England banks  wanted  to respond  to the 
growing scale of firms, and the economies of  scope and scale from universal 
banking, by merging. When banks were able to merge, their profits increased 
substantially. Ultimately, however, national and state banking laws stood in the 
way of bank mergers or branching, as unit bankers blocked attempts to liberal- 
ize branching laws and prevented attempted mergers. 
Over this same period (1850-1900),  a German financial system dominated 
by  private bankers transformed into the premier universal banking system of 
the world. Early examples of success in chartering limited-liability industrial 
banks elsewhere in Europe (notably the Credit Mobilier) and legal changes in 
Germany allowing limited-liability banking on a national scale paved the way 
for financial innovations that spread rapidly after 1870 (Tilly 1966, 1992; Kin- 
dleberger 1984). In contrast to the United States, where banking powers were 
limited compared to the growing powers of industrial corporations during the 
Progressive  Era, Germany was relatively  liberal in its treatment of  banking 
powers and restrictive of nonfinancial firms (Tilly 1982, 653). 
8.4  The Persistence of Inefficient Regulation 
Thus far I have argued from comparisons of German and American financial 
systems that differences in banking regulation inhibited the development of an 
optimal mechanism for corporate finance in the United States. Restrictions on 
branching and consolidation restricted  the  size of banks. These became im- 
portant  constraints on the development  of  universal banking during the late 
nineteenth century as the size of  firms and their borrowing needs expanded. 
The Clayton Act of 19  14 may have further hampered America’s ability to de- 
velop  universal  banking,  by  limiting  bankers’  influence  over  client  firms 
through interlocking boards of directors. Thus, universal banking of  the Ger- 
man type was never possible in the United States, even before Glass-Steagall 
restrictions on underwriting by affiliates of commercial banks.26 
Nevertheless,  during the  1920s, the U.S. financial  system began to “con- 
verge” to a system of larger banks operating branches and performing combi- 
nations  of  commercial banking, investment banking, and trust  activities  like 
26. Kroszner  and Rajan (1994). in  their  study  of  differences between the bond-underwriting 
activities of investment banks and investment banking affiliates of commercial banks, find little 
evidence for greater efficiency  of  affiliates.  The experience of  the  1920s in  the  United  States 
indicates little, however, about the advantages of universal banking. Removing Glass-Steagall pro- 
hibitions along  with  repealing the  Clayton Act  and removing  branching restrictions on banks 
(which would permit U.S. banks to operate true universal banks) would likely have a much larger 
positive effect. Furthermore, investment banking affiliates in the 1920s were very new enterprises. 
Given more time and experience, their performance might have improved. 306  Charles W.  Calomiris 
Table 8.13  Progressive Developments in US.  Banking and 
Corporate Finance, 1920s 
Banking Trends 
Bank Shon-Term Loans 
# Banks  Bank  # of Banks  Branching  to Nonfinancial Corporations 













1922  277 
1923  314 
1924  372 
1925  413 
1926  464 
1927  493 
1928  561 
1929  591 
127  128 
119  1  I9 
128  128 
118  118 
142  143 
154  154 
134  134 
123  123 
119  125 
178  178 
181  183 
281  292 
337  340 
325  325 
350  352 
352  356 
429  429 
543  544 
501  507 














764 (3,353)  10,699 
Gross Sales of Corporate Securities Issues, Annual Averages (billions of $) 
Stock  Industrial Stocks  Corporate Bonds  Industrial Bonds 
1901-12  0.5  0.15 
19  13-22  0.7  0.40 
1923-27  I .6  0.64 









Sources: Corporate finance data are from Friend  1967, 68. Data on banks operating securities 
affiliates are from Peach 1941.83. Bank merger data are from Chapman 1934.56. Bank branching 
data are from Board of  Governors of  the Federal Reserve System  1976, 297. Bank lending to 
nonfinancial firms is from Goldsmith 1958. 339. 
German universal banks. As shown in table 8.13, the progressive trend in the 
United  States  in  the  1920s is  visible  in  many  measures,  including  bank 
branching and consolidation, bank financing of industry, the development of 
long-term lending from banks to industrial enterprises, and the growing pro- 
portion of  equity finance relative to debt. Consistent with the argument that 
economies of  scope in universal banking are enhanced by large-scale banking, 
the dramatic increase in bank involvement in securities markets in the  1920s 307  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
coincided with a dramatic increase in consolidation and branching by  banks. 
Investment banking  affiliates of national  banks played an important part in 
these progressive trends. They operated on a larger scale than their investment 
bank competitors, performed a greater variety of functions, and often charged 
lower commissions to customers in securities transactions (Preston and Finlay 
1930a, 1930b). While investment banking affiliates did not lead to universal 
banking of the German kind (branching restrictions still applied in many states 
and branching was not allowed across state lines), the relaxation of branching 
restrictions  in  the  1920s was  associated  with  a trend  toward greater bank 
involvement in underwriting. Even in nonbranching states like Illinois, concen- 
tration of deposit and trust activities in large Chicago banks encouraged bank 
underwriting (Bureau of Business Research 1928). 
In the wake of the Great Depression of the 1930s, however, the United States 
chose to limit the scope of banking with the restrictive Banking Acts of  1933 
and 1935, to discourage bank consolidation through mergers, and to eschew 
the relaxation of  branching laws in favor of  deposit insurance as a means to 
insulate small banks and their depositors from the threat of bank failure and 
systemic panic. This reversal in direction in the  1930s is hard to understand 
on efficiency grounds and seems best viewed as the last and most successful 
in a long series of  attacks by  populist forces on large-scale banking. It also 
suggests that, with respect to financial regulation, the United States is singu- 
larly incapable of learning from the past. 
Explanations for the change in  direction that occurred in the wake of the 
Great Depression have been suggested by Calomiris and White (1  994). They 
argue that politicking by powerful unit bankers (Stigler 1971) does not explain 
the change in direction in banking regulation. The power of unit bankers was 
at an all-time low in 1930 due to the many failures of small banks. Further- 
more, deposit-insurance legislation won by unit bankers from 1908 to 1920 in 
eight  states was responsible  for financial devastation in the states that had 
passed such legislation (Calomiris 1989, 1990, 1991b). Calomiris and White 
(1994) argue that despite these facts the credibility of large bankers, and of 
large banks operating securities affiliates, was undermined by the accusations 
of the Pecora hearings and by the political campaigning of Steagall and others 
who managed to portray big banking, and links between  securities markets 
and banks, as the cause of the Great Depression. Furthermore, unprecedented 
depositor losses galvanized support for deposit insurance. Once the Great De- 
pression legislation was passed, it resuscitated unit banks as a powerful special 
interest resisting reform or repeal of Great Depression protections. 
Since the Great Depression, other factors may have worked against repeal 
of Depression-era regulations. Endogenous technological changes induced by 
inefficient regulations may have helped to perpetuate regulations by reducing 
their costs. For example, technological changes that produced declines in un- 
derwriting costs in the United States in the 1960s, notably the increased role 
of  private placements and of  securities purchases in bulk by institutional in- 308  Charles W.  Calomiris 
vestors, may have lessened the pressure to repeal the separation between com- 
mercial and investment banking. Another example is the rise of finance compa- 
nies and the modem commercial paper market, beginning in the 1960s, and 
the development of  the relatively unregulated  bank  CD market,  which kept 
Regulation Q restrictions from significantly increasing industrial finance costs. 
Today, the effects on financing costs from increased capital requirements and 
other regulatory  costs on banking  are mitigated by  the growth of loan sales 
markets and asset securitization. 
Of course, the past is not always a perfect guide to the future. Perhaps pres- 
sure from globalization of finance has lowered the tolerance for poor regula- 
tion in the United States. There is much discussion about expanding bank pow- 
ers to branch and provide a wide array of products, and some limited progress 
has been  made on both fronts. New  entrants  from abroad have encouraged 
these trends. From this perspective, recent international coordination in bank 
regulation (the Basle capital standards)  is a particularly  interesting develop- 
ment. It may signal the erosion of domestic autonomy in bank regulation and 
greater  international  competition, or it  may  be  a  harbinger  of  agreements 
among governments to limit international competition  and protect regulatory 
autonomy. Time will tell. 
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Comment  Peter Temin 
This is a good, ambitious paper.  It is a good paper for this conference and 
volume because Calomiris has undertaken  to analyze an important economic 
organization. It is ambitious because it argues that institutional arrangements 
are very,  very  important. The structure  of  the banking  system, Calomiris as- 
serts, affects the rate of economic growth, the composition of the capital stock, 
and-implicitly-the  rate of productivity change in the economy as a whole. 
Before I comment on how Calomiris gets to these conclusions and on the 
support he musters for them, I would like to place this paper in the context of 
this conference and its predecessor.  That conference, which was reported in 
Inside the Business Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on the Use of Informa- 
tion (Chicago, 1991), dealt primarily with flows of information inside business 
organizations-through  accounting, production reports, standardized informa- 
tion, and so forth. This conference has extended the concern with information 
to include the coordination of activity both within and between firms. 
Calomiris emphasizes the importance of information flows in his paper. He 
argues that one of the primary roles of economic organizations is to control 
the flow of information. On the assumption that information flows more easily 
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within organizations than between them, Calomiris applauds the role of some 
large organizations, that is, universal banks. He does not assert that institutions 
all work equally efficiently or even that there is a tendency for the institutional 
control of information to become more efficient over time. He closes his paper 
with some thoughts on the political evolution of information-handling institu- 
tions. 
Economists have paid increasing attention to the importance of information 
in recent years. Courses in advanced economic theory routinely  spend much 
of their time detailing and analyzing the flow of information in different mod- 
els. This research, expressed in the formal, mathematical terms beloved of eco- 
nomic  theorists, is not very  accessible to business historians. This clash  of 
cultures gives rise to a problem of  information flows in our disciplines that 
mirrors the problems we analyze. 
Economic theorists express great interest in the work of business historians. 
They say that they are looking for examples of information flows to model in 
their theories. But these theories often do not feed back into business histories 
because they are hard to read and to apply. The historians assert that they deal 
with information flows all the time, that information is a critical part of man- 
agement. But their expositions are not read much by economic theorists be- 
cause they are not directed toward the questions posed by the theorists. 
These conferences and volumes are designed to lessen the distance between 
these two groups. If business historians can learn how economists approach 
questions, they can present their narratives in ways that illuminate these prob- 
lems. And if economic theorists  learn  more business history, they will  find 
ample material to model. 
Calomiris addresses this communication gap in his paper. He precedes his 
historical evidence with a description of the theoretical literature on the impor- 
tance of information in banking. He provides a fine readers’ guide to this litera- 
ture for the interested business historian. This does not overcome the difficulty 
of reading abstract mathematical papers, but it is a start. In addition, Calomi- 
ris’s history stays close to the questions raised in his theoretical overview, rai- 
sing questions for economists interested in extending the theory. 
While this explicit focus on information would be enough to make Calomi- 
risk paper a fitting capstone for this volume, there is another connection to the 
preceding conference as well. The previous volume  closes with  two papers 
on banking. Lamoreaux argued that American commercial banks in the early 
nineteenth century provided  investment funds, albeit primarily to the banks’ 
directors. But as investments became geographically dispersed, making infor- 
mation about them costly, commercial banks gradually specialized in provid- 
ing short-term trade credit. Commercial banks as we know them appeared only 
in the late nineteenth century. De Long analyzed the most famous of the private 
bankers who took over the role of providing industrial finance as the commer- 
cial banks abandoned this activity. He argued that the House of  Morgan pro- 317  The Costs of Rejecting Universal Banking 
vided a real economic benefit to the firms doing business with it. Morgan firms 
were worth more than similar firms without the Morgan connection. 
Calomiris extends these papers by comparing the financial system described 
by Lamoreaux and De Long to that in Germany. While those two authors asked 
how the American banking system functioned at the turn of the twentieth cen- 
tury, Calomiris evaluates the turn-of-the-century banking system by comparing 
it with a structure that evolved quite differently. The intellectual links among 
these three papers are evident from Calomiris’s frequent citations of the two 
earlier contributions. Taken together, the three papers on banking constitute a 
model of  the kind of  intellectual inquiry that these conferences and volumes 
are designed to foster. 
Like Gaul, Calomiris’s paper is divided into three parts. He opens with the 
theoretical  discussion just noted.  This is  followed  by  a  description  of  the 
American and German banking systems as seen through this theoretical lens. 
Finally Calomiris argues that the different banking structures in the two coun- 
tries led to a variety of different experiences. He suggests that universal banks 
had effects that stretched from the composition of aggregate German invest- 
ment to the way in which individual German firms were financed. 
Calomiris centers his theoretical discussion on what he calls the “pecking 
order” of corporate finance. The term suggests a normative hierarchy, but the 
order seems rather to describe the stages that companies actually go through 
as they age. More precisely, Calomiris’s pecking order describes the stages of 
growth that American companies generally experience; he argues that the or- 
der is not a general one. One function of business history is to reveal whether 
such patterns are universal or dependent on specific institutional arrangements. 
(The theoretical literature may emphasize the American experience because it 
is largely American.) 
In this story, a nascent firm first gets capital from retained earnings and rich 
uncles. As the enterprise grows, it begins to compile a track record. This infor- 
mation  allows it to borrow  from banks. That is, the firm generates enough 
information to attract short-term, fixed-yield investments by local institutions. 
A bit farther down the path, the enterprise can obtain equity investment from 
knowledgeable people or specialized institutions. The reach of the information 
is not necessarily any wider, but the longer record encourages investors to pro- 
vide capital on longer terms and without fixed repayment schedules. Investors 
cross the line between loans and equity investment. 
If the enterprise continues to prosper and grow, it reaches a size where infor- 
mation about it becomes publicly available. The company then can sell bonds 
on a public  market.  There is enough information  generally  available  for a 
variety of people and institutions to perform the lending function first under- 
taken by banks. With continued growth, the public at large becomes willing 
to cross the line between bonds and stocks, just as knowledgeable specialized 
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available to it the choice of raising capital by issuing publicly available bonds 
or stocks. 
This pecking order describes how a business firm interfaces with financial 
institutions at various stages of its growth. The implied order of  preference 
comes from the fact that the large, mature enterprise has a choice of funding 
sources  because  information  about  it  is  prevalent.  The  mature  enterprise 
chooses the least costly form of  finance-which  we consider the  most  de- 
sirable. 
This five-step process is presented as a logical exercise. It is the result of the 
expanding size of an enterprise in need of  capital and the growing circle of 
people and organizations with enough information  to consider supplying the 
company’s needs. But this pecking order is hardly the only way for the capital 
needs of growing companies to be  supplied. The second part of  Calomiris’s 
exposition is a description of  how this pecking order emerged in the United 
States and how an alternative banking structure arose in Germany. 
Instead  of  going  through  five  distinct  steps,  German  companies  went 
through only two or three. Calomiris does not discuss the first step of insider 
financing very much, and we can leave it aside. Bank financing for small com- 
panies was present in both countries. In America, it was supplanted by equity 
funding, then bonds, then publicly traded stocks. In Germany, by contrast, bank 
lending continued throughout the life of the firm, obviating the middle steps 
in the  pecking  order.  A capital-hungry  enterprise  went  directly from  bank 
credit to public stock. 
Calomiris argues that the simpler German system economized on resources 
used to gather information. Fewer steps meant fewer people and institutions 
that needed to be informed. Continuity in the source of capital further meant 
that new organizations did not have to gather information each time a firm 
moved to the next stage. 
Several questions arise about this argument. First, did less articulation nec- 
essarily reduce costs? Could it also have led to mismatches between supplying 
and demanding banks and firms, say, for intermediate-sized enterprises? Is it 
possible  that  German  firms were  starved  for capital  at some stage in  their 
growth? Second, even if the American system was more costly, is part of the 
extra cost attributable to the larger size of the United States rather than to the 
American institutions? Phrased  differently, would  the  concentrated  German 
banking system have worked as well in the vast United States as it did in Ger- 
many? Third, did the concentration of German capital supplies in a few institu- 
tions encourage market power either in the financial or product markets? (Ca- 
lomiris discusses the last question and says no.) 
One of the important contributions of this paper is Calomiris’s clear state- 
ment of the problem and the theory underlying it. The other is the extensive 
information he compiled to demonstrate the effects of  the different banking 
systems. The third part of the paper contains a collection of empirical demon- 
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strength  because Calomiris has marshalled an impressive  array of  disparate 
data; a weakness because there is no indication that any single test is critical. 
Calomiris opens his demonstration with aggregate data about Germany and 
the United  States. He argues that the capital-output ratio in late-nineteenth- 
century Germany, the share of equipment in the capital stock, and the growth 
of labor productivity were all higher in Germany. 
These observations are consistent in the sense that a single view of German 
capital deepening can include them all. But it is not clear that the structure of 
the banking system can explain  the per capita rate of capital accumulation. 
Demonstration of this point requires consideration of  savings behavior as well 
of investment funds. Japan today appears to have both integrated banks and a 
high saving rate, but it is not usual to assert that the former is the cause of the 
latter. This is not to say it is not, only that the kind of data presented in Calomi- 
risk  paper cannot be used to test this hypothesis. 
The key evidence in this paper to my mind is in tables 8.7 and 8.8. There 
Calomiris presents estimates of the cost of issuing common stock in Germany 
and the United States. Unfortunately, only the German data refer to the period 
before World War I that is the focus of the paper; the American data are from 
the interwar period. Calomiris argues that American bankers’ spreads in the 
issuance of stock were not rising over time and that the later data can be seen 
as a lower bound for the  (unobserved) earlier figures. This implies that the 
banking restrictions of the  1930s did not raise financing costs. More work is 
needed to evaluate this implicit contention. 
Calomiris argues that what he labels “mean bank spread” is a better indica- 
tion of the organizational and informational costs of issuing stock in Germany 
than “mean total cost,” which includes taxes and physical costs like printing. 
The “mean bank spreads” are less than 4 percent of the issue for most firms. 
These German costs are contrasted with the American data from the 1930s in 
table 8.8. The cost of issuing common stock in the United States was about 20 
percent-or  five times as high as the German cost! 
This is a dramatic result. I have pointed out some potential problems with 
the data, but these caveats only serve to show how difficult it is to find the 
relevant information. Calomiris is to be congratulated for finding as much as 
he did and encouraged to follow this general paper with a more focused explo- 
ration of these costs. 
If the data are even approximately correct, they indicate that the theoretical 
arguments surveyed by  Calomiris in the early parts of the paper are very im- 
portant indeed. Capital was much cheaper for enterprises at the last stage of 
the pecking order in Germany. The German Grossbanken clearly were able to 
place common stocks with far less trouble than the syndicates led by  invest- 
ment banks in the United States. 
This conclusion raises a theoretical question about Calomiris’s pecking or- 
der. He has exposed the costs of moving from step to step. But it is not clear 
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high costs. Firms at this level were larger and well known; why was informa- 
tion about them so scarce in the 1930s? Are we sure this scarcity was a result 
of the banking structure? Could it have been a reflection of conditions in the 
Depression or of other aspects of the economy? 
The data imply that the German banks were not exercising market power in 
their commissions, despite their concentration. By contrast, the data do not 
indicate whether the large American spreads are the results of the information 
costs described by Calomiris or the market power alleged by many contempo- 
rary observers. They also do not say how large financing costs were at other 
stages of the pecking order. Calomiris suggests that the costs at the top of the 
order should be a lower bound to costs along the way, but a test of this proposi- 
tion would enhance his argument. 
Although  this is the most important evidence that Calomiris marshals, his 
other  evidence  also  will  repay  study.  He  provides  several  different  ap- 
proaches-examining  corporate balance sheets, national balance sheets, and a 
variety of estimated costs of financing-to  bolster his contention that financing 
costs were far cheaper in Germany than in the United States in the early years 
of the twentieth century. It is a tour de force. 
It may be fitting to close with a statement of issues we need to keep in mind 
as we continue this exploration of the common ground between economic the- 
ory and business history. 
This paper, in common with most essays in business history, has a large- 
organization  bias.  Historians  write  about  groups  that  leave  records;  busi- 
ness historians, about enterprises that succeed. This natural tendency shades 
into an implicit presumption  that bigger is better.  Alfred Chandler may  be 
credited with providing intellectual justification for this presumption in man- 
ufacturing;  Calomiris’s  theory  does the  same for banking.  All  these  argu- 
ments may be correct, but their current popularity should make us always ask 
for proof. 
In addition, this is a paper for the nineties. The American economy has its 
problems, and it is natural to find their roots in deep-seated malfunctions. A 
banking system that appears to have gotten steadily  worse for a century or 
more is made to order for the current mood. 
The explicit message of Calomiris’s paper is that integration is needed when 
markets fail. The market failure in business financing comes from the high cost 
of information; an integrated bank that conserves information is the cure. The 
implicit message is even stronger: integration generally is better than the mar- 
ket. We must make very sure that we are not falling into a common attitude 
instead of examining each case on its merits. 
Finally, this paper-like  others in this volume-analyzes  activities  at the 
boundaries of business organizations. Too often we assume that activities inter- 
nal to a firm are totally different from external processes, that there is a sharp 
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papers remind us that the boundaries themselves may be endogenous and that 
any discontinuity in the continuum of information costs at a company bound- 
ary may be specific to an industry. Calomiris argues forcefully in this paper 
that the discontinuity in banking is both large and important for the functioning 
of the entire economy. This Page Intentionally Left Blank